Friends of Trillanes

Detention won't hamper Senate work - Trillanes lawyer

2007-06-14T02:11:00.000-07:00

AMITA LEGASPI, GMANews.TV

06/14/2007 | 03:30 PM

Former Navy Lieutenant Senior Grade Antonio Trillanes IV's continued detention will not deter him from serving his mandate as one of the country' senators, his lawyer Reynaldo Robles said.

In a chance interview Thursday, Robles believed Trillanes will be a more focused senator because he has no other things to do except to concentrate on law-making.

"Nakikita kong lalo nga siyang magiging focus sa trabaho niya kasi imagine-in mo siya ay gagawa ng batas..paggising niya wala naman siyang ibang gagawn kundi magtrabaho," he said.

He added: "Hindi siya pwede magbulakbol, hindi siya puwedeng mamasyal sa mall o hindi siya pwedeng mag-night club. So, sa tingin ko mas magiging focus siya sa trabaho niya."

Robles further said his client "will try to work in accordance sa kinommit niyang legislative program."

He said Trillanes have at least 20 proposed bills ranging from anti-corruption, poverty alleviation and education.

"I think he is preparing those bills and hopefully mai-file as soon as ma-open ang Senado," he said.

He further said one of Trillanes' principal advocacies is reforms in the Armed Forces of the Philippines .

"Ang paniwala niya dahil nakita nila bilang mga sundalo yung mga problema sa AFP, ang paniwala niya ay makakatulong siya sa pagreresolve ng mga problema," Robles said.

But first things first, Robles expressed hope the Department of Justice would not oppose their motion for the temporary release of Trillanes from detention to attend the proclamation at the Comelec main office in Intramuros, Manila.

This, despite the mixed signals Trillanes' group had been receiving from state prosecutors.

The Comelec had earlier said Trillanes' proclamation was scheduled 9:30 a.m. Friday.

"On June 7, Assistant State Prosecutor Richard Anthony Fadullon said that they will not oppose but I also saw on TV Assistant State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera saying that they will oppose so medyo mixed signals pero I'd rather believe na yung paglabas kay Capt. Trillanes ay kagustuhan ng taumbayan siguro naman ay marapat pagbigyan yung proclamation lang...hindi naman ito humihingi na palabasin siya ng matagal e, ilang oras lang naman yun," he said.

He further said the votes for Trillanes were a combination of those who believe in him, those who were not satisfied with the current administration or protest votes and those who count on him being a public servant.

Robles believed Trillanes is the first senator elected from prison.

He said they would ask the court to allow his client to attend Senate sessions.

"Ang sabi sa akin ni Capt. Trillanes ayaw niyang abusuhin ang tiwala ng taumbayan. He does not want to use this as a ticket, as a way out dun sa kanyang detention," he said.

He added: "Walang problema sa kanya kung kailangang umuwi siya sa selda pag gabi ang importante lang gusto niya makapagsilbi sa taumbayan in accordance with the mandate given to him by the people." - GMANews.TV

Trillanes is newest senator; proclamation set on Friday

2007-06-14T02:09:00.000-07:00

AMITA LEGASPI, GMANews.TV

06/14/2007 | 11:47 AM

(Updated 12:30 p.m.) The National Board of Canvassers (NBC) will proclaim on Friday this week former Navy Lieutenant Senior Grade Antonio Trillanes IV as the 11th winning senatorial candidate of the May 14 polls.

Trillanes, a participant in the failed Oakwood Mutiny in 2003, was finally considered a winner after the NBC counted the votes from Surigao del Norte. He took 16th place there with 44,604 votes, giving him a nationwide total of 11,138,067.

This leaves Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, a colleague of Trillanes at the Genuine Opposition (GO), and Juan Miguel Zubiri of Team Unity as the contenders for the final slot in the Magic 12.

Trillanes now leads Pimentel by 272,666 and Zubiri, by 384,227.

The NBC still has to tabulate votes from Maguindanao which has 337,108 registered voters and 12 precincts in Basilan at least 31,000 voters.

"I really believe it is mathematically impossible to overcome the lead of Mr. Trillanes. In view of this, the board has decided to have a partial proclamation again, in favor of Mr. Trillanes," said Benjamin Abalos, chair of the NBC and the Commission on Elections (Comelec).

"The board has decided to have a partial proclamation again tomorrow morning (9:30 a.m.) before the Maguindanao hearing," he said.

In a radio interview, GO spokesman Adel Tamano expressed elation with the development.

Tamano said that, "We are very happy with that. That's wonderful news."

He urged Trillanes' counsel Rey Robles to immediately ask the court to allow the winning candidate to attend the proclamation rites tomorrow.

"Our preference is that during the proclamation, that he be physically there," Tamano added.

Tamano noted that NBC's decision came a day after GO urged elections commissioners to proclaim Trillanes. GO then said that the waiting time would leave a window for the administration to rig the poll results.

Robles, in a separate interview on dzBB radio, said every legal effort would be done to bring Trillanes to the NBC proclamation.

"We will be working on that, we will do our best ... we are hopeful that Makati regional trial court-Branch 148 will grant our request," Robles said in Filipino.

He added that, "I think Senator Trillanes' request is such a small thing (maliit na bagay lang)."

Trillanes, a member of the mutinous Magdalo group, is currently detained at the Philippine Marine Corps headquarters in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.

He has been charged with coup d' etat over the Oakwood Mutiny and is undergoing court martial proceedings.

Trillanes is the fourth graduate of the Philippine Military Academy to make up the new Senate. He is a member of PMA Class '95.

Other PMA alumni are Senators Rodolfo Biazon of Class '61, as well as classmates Gregorio Honasan and Panfilo Lacson of Class '71.

Political analysts had earlier warned that a supposed "military bloc" would wield tremendous influence in the Senate. - GMANews.TV

SALAMAT

2007-05-25T02:50:00.000-07:00

MGA KAIBIGAN KO, SALAMAT

To all our Volunteers, Supporters, and all Filipinos who believed there is hope for our Motherland,

The past 90 days had truly been anastonishing experience.

At first, I had fears that my candidacy, platform and message would be unacceptable to the Filipino people. But as the campaign period went by it was apparent that such was not the case.

In fact, by the firstweek of March, when our resources wereabout to be depleted, our campaign had been practically sustained and carried forth by anintense spirit of volunteerism all over the country and from all walks of life. This, plus the outpouring of good will and support from the different sectors of society, made our moral victory complete. Yes, there is hope for our country. YOU ARE THAT HOPE.

I admit that we still have a long way togo before we can claimelectoral victory and, as I have said before, I expect this administration to cheat. Hence, weshould not put our guard down.

We must continue to be vigilant in thecoming days to ensure that your collective will is respected and upheld. To all of you, who participated or supported in any way in this campaign, I give my whole-heartedthanks. You will forever be my inspiration, my motivation and my strength.

May God Bless our Country!

ANTONIO FUENTES TRILLANES IV

Trillanes has only five poll watchers, mom says

2007-05-18T04:46:00.000-07:00

Trillanes has only five poll watchers, mom says

By Edson C. Tandoc Jr.InquirerLast updated 01:14am (Mla time) 05/18/2007

MANILA, Philippines -- Seeing her son in and out of the Magic 12 as the canvassing of votes for senatorial candidates continues, the 68-year-old mother of detained mutiny leader Antonio Trillanes IV is not at all nervous.
"From the beginning, I have offered everything to God. That is why I don't feel stressed," Estelita Trillanes told the Philippine Daily Inquirer in a phone interview on Thursday.

Not even the threat of cheating worries her: "You know, when you pray, no evil can overtake you. Dagdag-bawas (vote padding and shaving) is considered evil. How can evil overtake goodness?"

The voices of her grandchildren playing could be heard as she spoke on the phone. She said she was in the house of one of her daughters.

Trillanes' mother was instrumental in ending the Oakwood mutiny on July 27, 2003 when she personally met with President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in an attempt to save her son as the ultimatum for the mutineers’ surrender neared.

On Thursday, she was monitoring the canvassing of votes through news reports. She said her family did not have enough money to pay for poll watchers.

Trillanes of the Genuine Opposition has volunteers, but there are only five of them watching the official canvassing at the Philippine International Convention Center and only two monitoring the quick count by the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections.

"We are leaving it to the Genuine Opposition. We cannot afford individual watchers," the mother said.

Her son's strong showing, despite being behind bars and campaigning with limited funds, did not surprise her.

"We saw during the campaign the attitude of people toward my son. They would approach his campaign volunteers to ask for calendars. Some donated calendars and shirts," she said.

Mrs Trillanes was not active during the campaign, saying she was already too weak to go around places. But she said she asked her friends and relatives to support her son.

In the latest tally of the Commission on Elections as of 5:54 p.m. Thursday, Trillanes placed 10th with 80,823 votes.

Trillanes thanks voters for ‘astonishing’ run

2007-05-18T04:38:00.000-07:00

Trillanes thanks voters for ‘astonishing’ run

05/18/2007 08:07 AM

Even as he remains in detention for rebellion charges, opposition senatorial bet Antonio Trillanes IV thanked his volunteers and supporters for fueling his “astonishing" campaign run.

Trillanes posted the message dated Wednesday in a statement on his blog site (magdaloparasapagbabago.blogspot.com), even as he called on his supporters to remain vigilant.

“I admit that we still have a long way to go before we can claim electoral victory and, as I have said before, I expect this administration to cheat. Hence, we should not put our guard down. We must continue to be vigilant in the coming days to ensure that your collective will is respected and upheld," he said in his message.

Still, he said the past 90-day campaign period had “truly been an astonishing experience," where he admitted fears his candidacy would be unacceptable to the Filipino people.

Trillanes, who faces rebellion charges over the Oakwood Mutiny of 2003, spent most of the campaign period from his detention facility.His family joined the Genuine Opposition (GO) in campaigning for him during the 90-day campaign.

Trillanes addressed the GO miting de avance last May 11 through a videotaped message.“As the campaign period went by it was apparent that such was not the case.

In fact, by the first week of March, when our resources were about to be depleted, our campaign had been practically sustained and carried forth by an intense spirit of volunteerism all over the country and from all walks of life. This, plus the outpouring of goodwill and support from the different sectors of society, made our moral victory complete.

Yes, there is hope for our country. YOU ARE THAT HOPE," Trillanes said in his message.He relayed his “whole-hearted thanks" to those who participated or supported in any way in his campaign.“You will forever be my inspiration, my motivation and my strength. May God Bless our Country!" he said. - GMANews.TV

MARAMI PONG SALAMAT!

2007-05-17T00:33:00.001-07:00

MARAMI PONG SALAMAT SA SUPORTA AT PAGTITIWALA!

MABUHAY ANG MALAYA AT MARANGAL NA FILIPINO!

Trillanes hangs on to Magic 12

2007-05-17T00:27:00.000-07:00

Trillanes hangs on to Magic 12

By Cathy C. Yamsuan, Nikko DizonInquirerLast updated 04:06am (Mla time) 05/17/2007
MANILA, Philippines -- It was 8-2-2 in favor of the Genuine Opposition (GO) as of 9:11

Wednesday night in the quick count by the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections.
GO increased its lead over the administration’s Team Unity (TU) in the official count of the overseas absentee votes.

It was 8-3-1 for GO, according to partial results of the canvassing presided over by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers.
After slipping out of the Magic 12 in early tabulation Wednesday, Antonio Trillanes IV moved up to 11th place based on Namfrel’s tally as of 9:11 Wednesday night.

TU’s Juan Miguel Zubiri who earlier placed 12th in the winning circle dropped to No. 13 with Trillanes’ reentry.

From 8th place, Trillanes slid to 13th place Wednesday afternoon before climbing to 11th place Wednesday night. TU’s Edgardo Angara and Joker Arroyo maintained their steady climb in the Magic 12 in the Namfrel count.

GO’s Francis Escudero, who was trailing fellow GO candidate Loren Legarda Wednesday afternoon, captured the top slot Wednesday night but by a very narrow margin of 116 votes.
GO’s Alan Peter Cayetano climbed to 9th place from 10th, exchanging places with independent Gregorio Honasan who slid to 10th. Aquilino Pimentel III of GO dropped from 11th place to 12th.

The women’s group Gabriela was the front-runner among party-list groups, followed by Buhay and Bayan Muna.

At its headquarters at the La Salle gym in Greenhills, San Juan, Namfrel had so far counted votes from 24,394 precincts from all regions.

Results from 15 countries

Over at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) in Pasay City, the official Comelec tabulation of the certificates of canvass (CoCs) for the senatorial elections began Wednesday with results from 15 countries and a US territory in the overseas absentee voting.
The votes came from the following countries: Laos, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, South Korea, Austria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Netherlands, Japan, India, Thailand, Bahrain, and Palau, a US territory.

There were a total of 38,469 registered voters in these places but only 5,742 or almost 15 percent voted in May.

Only one voted in Slovenia. No votes were cast in Kiribati and Solomon Islands.
Angara rose from 11th place at the start of the Namfrel tabulation Tuesday morning to 7th place Wednesday night, while Arroyo climbed from 12th to 8th place.

Legarda topped tabulations in Regions 1, 2, 8, 11, 12 and the Cordillera Administrative Region.
Escudero was No. 1 in Metro Manila, Regions 4, 5 and 10, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and the Caraga region.

Angara remained in 1st place in Central Luzon and Region 7.

Panfilo Lacson of GO was No. 1 in Region 9 tabulations and maintained his 3rd place standing in the Namfrel count with 996,017 votes.

GO guest candidate Manuel Villar was first in Region 6 and placed fourth on the Namfrel list.
Independent candidate Francis Pangilinan was steady at No. 5.
Benigno Aquino III also maintained his standing in 6th place.

Trailing Trillanes

Trailing Trillanes were Pimentel, Zubiri, TU’s Ralph Recto at No. 14; Prospero Pichay at No. 15 and Michael Defensor at No. 16.

GO’s Sonia Roco was in 17th place followed by TU’s Cesar Montano and GO’s John Osmeña.
Along with Trillanes, Roco and Osmeña’s rankings dropped dramatically as tabulations from the various regions came in Wednesday.

Roco started in 13th place when Namfrel began its tabulation. Osmeña initially was in 16th place.

Pichay enjoyed a steady climb from No. 18 since Namfrel began its count.

Comelec count

In the Comelec count, Pangilinan was in 1st place, followed by Legarda. Aquino was in 3rd place; Villar, 4th, and Escudero, 5th. Arroyo was in 6th place; Lacson, 7th; Cayetano, 8th; Angara, 9th; Pimentel, 10th; Roco, 11th, and Defensor, 12th.

Zubiri was in 13th place, followed by Vicente “Tito” Sotto III, Honasan and Osmeña.

The canvassing will resume Thursday at 10 a.m. with CoCs from Malaysia and vote-rich Hong Kong.

At a press conference, Comelec Chair Benjamin Abalos Sr. said that the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) hoped to complete the canvassing for both OAV and CoCs from the provinces and Metro Manila “within 10 days” and proclaim the winners.

Abalos said that the NBC might partially canvass the CoCs in the 13 municipalities in Lanao del Sur depending on the election results there following a yet-to-be-scheduled special elections in the province.

“If the result of the 13 municipalities could no longer affect the result of the national position for senators, then we would not have to wait for the results of the special elections,” Abalos said.
Roco’s visit

Roco paid a visit to the Namfrel headquarters Wednesday night, intending to ask which areas in Mindanao the citizen’s arm had already included in its tabulation.

In a chance interview, Roco expressed concern over “30 towns in Mindanao” where the Commission on Elections had declared a failure of elections.

“This is a recurring phenomenon, or event, that every election, that a failure of elections is declared in certain towns, usually in the same places. They (authorities) should hold the elections in these places in the next 15 days,” she said.

Roco noted that an estimated 300,000 votes could still be counted from the problematic areas, a number that is significant enough to alter the outcome of the senatorial race.

Still, Roco expressed confidence that her current rank would still improve because both Namfrel and Comelec tabulations were still in their early stages of counting. With reports from Kristine Mangunay, Aaron John del Rosario, Cyrian Agujo and Nathaniel Melican

Trillanes was simply more attractive than Honasan

2007-04-23T00:45:00.000-07:00

Honasan inclusion in GO unlikely over Aquino protest
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=61986
By Maila Ager
INQUIRER.net
Last updated 03:14pm (Mla time) 04/23/2007

MANILA, Philippines -- Now it can be told: It was the group of former president Corazon Aquino that had allegedly objected to the inclusion of former senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan in the opposition’s senatorial ticket.

Former ambassador Ernesto Maceda disclosed this on Monday as he ruled out the possibility that his friend, Honasan, might still be included in the senatorial slate of the Genuine Opposition (GO).

“The main objection came from the Cory [the former leader’s nickname] group so the Liberal Party could bring Noynoy in,” Maceda said in a phone interview, referring to opposition senatorial bet and Tarlac Representative Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III, an LP member.

“Remember, Honasan had rebelled against Cory so it was very clear that Noynoy and his mother would have not joined the UNO [United Opposition] if he is in our slate,” Maceda said, referring to several failed attempts by the former military officer and his group to oust Aquino in the ‘80s.

Maceda did not identify who in the opposition belonged to the “Cory group” but Chit Asis, director-general of the LP, said those identified with the former president, aside from her son, were LP president and Senator Franklin Drilon, former congressman Florencio Abad, and the civil society group, the Black and White Movement.

In a separate interview however Leah Navarro of the Black and White Movement denied that her group had objected to Honasan’s inclusion in the GO list.

She confirmed though that the group’s urban sector, the Black and White Katipunan, had strongly pushed for the inclusion of rebel soldier, Navy Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes IV, in the opposition list.

For the civil society, Navarro said Trillanes was simply more attractive than Honasan.

“We have nothing against Honasan but some of us got disappointed when he filed his candidacy and said that he would be happy to get support from anyone, from any side. In effect, he was opening himself to the TEAM Unity,” she said.

“He was a little too eager to ask assistance from each side,” she said. ”If it’s true that he’s part of Oakwood mutiny, that flip-flopping is too quick. His long disappearance, what’s that all about? He has to clarify that,” said Navarro, referring to the shortlived rebellion by junior officers and soldiers in July 2003 that Honasan had allegedly masterminded. Trillanes had been part of that uprising.

Both are facing coup d’etat charges, although Honasan has been allowed to post bail.

Unless Honasan clarified his stand on the many issues surrounding the country, Navarro said it would be difficult for the civil society to believe his sincerity as an independent candidate.

Maceda admitted that while he had been rooting for Honasan, he could no longer insist on his inclusion in the opposition even if there was an available slot after Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan of the LP decided to run as an independent.

Maceda pointed out that some key opposition allies like Susan Roces, widow of the late presidential aspirant Fernando Poe Jr.; and Rez Cortez, actor and known supporter of Poe; and the LP had each endorsed a 12th candidate.

Roces and Cortez are backing independent senatorial bet and actor Richard Gomez while the LP-wing of Drilon is supporting the candidacy of Pangilinan.

Maceda said he was printing ballots containing the names of all 11 opposition candidates and Honasan.

GO spokesman Adel Tamano also ruled out the possibility of Honasan joining the opposition, citing its commitment with the LP not to get a replacement for Pangilinan.

“The Genuine Opposition has already expressed its opinion that we had agreements with our coalition partners, particularly the Liberal Party that we will not be taking in another candidate or a guest candidate,” Tamano said.

Meanwhile, Maceda discouraged Honasan from joining the administration slate or end up like former senators Vicente “Tito” Sotto and Tessie Aquino-Oreta, who he claimed were rating poorly in the surveys after joining the administration.

Honasan, Sotto, and Oreta were former members of the opposition.

Trillanes wants temporary leave from detention to campaign

2007-04-23T00:39:00.000-07:00

Trillanes wants temporary leave from detention to campaign
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?article_id=61936
By Joel Guinto
INQUIRER.net
Last updated 12:21pm (Mla time) 04/23/2007

MANILA, Philippines -- Ex-Navy Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes IV said he would ask the court handling his coup d'etat case to allow him to temporarily leave detention a week before the May 14 midterm elections so that he could personally campaign.

"It is important that I deliver my message personally to the people," Trillanes told INQUIRER.net in an interview at his detention cell in the Philippine Marine headquarters in Fort Bonifacio on Monday.

The official campaign period for national and local candidates ends on May 12, two days before Election Day.

Asked when he wanted to leave his cell, Trillanes said: "On the last week of the campaign."

Trillanes is among 31 junior officers and enlisted men who have been charged with coup d'etatMakati regional trial court over their alleged participation in a shortlived mutiny in July 2003. before Branch 148 of the

Last week, the former officer was allowed to grant media interviews from his cell on the condition that a copy of the questions to be asked would be submitted to the court and that a three-day notice before the interview be sent to his custodians.

"Our campaign received a shot in the arm because of this media access. We hope to break the top 12 at the end of the month," said Trillanes, who placed 21st in the March survey of the Social Weather Stations (SWS) and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the parent company of INQUIRER.net.

Trillanes said he has spent "close to P5 million" for the campaign, with the money coming from supporters and relatives, who recently staged two fund-raising events.

Asked how much he intended to spend for this Senate bid, Trillanes said: "As much as there is money available."

"My campaign is based on a proxy machinery to conduct the campaign on my behalf. Right now, they are going around the countryside to increase awareness and introduce the people to my legislative agenda and my background," he said.

MENSAHE NI TRILLANES

2007-02-24T02:07:00.000-08:00

MESSAGE OF ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV
GO Proclamation Rally
February 24, 2007

Maraming salamat po sa mga naririto ngayon at sa lahat ng mga sumusuporta at naniniwala sa mga ipinaglalaban namin sa Genuine Opposition

Ipagpaumanhin po ninyo at wala ako dito ngayon upang ipahayag ng personal ang mensaheng ito dahil hanggang sa ngayon nakakulong ako at ang aking mga kasamahan. Kung natatandaan ninyo, ibinunyag namin sa Oakwood noong 2003 ang iba’t ibang katiwalian sa gobyerno at sa AFP na nagdudulot sa walang katapusang digmaan sa Mindanao at ibang lugar sa Pilipinas. Ngayon, tatlo’t kalahating taon ang nakalipas, nandiyan pa rin ang katiwalian kung kaya’t nandiyan pa rin ang digmaan. Marami nang namatay at marami pang mamamatay; kailangan po nating tapusin ito. Iyan po ang isa sa mga pangunahing dahilan kung bakit ako tatakbo bilang senador.

Marami na po akong inihandang mga panukala na sumasakop sa iba’t ibang adhikain gaya ng: anti-corruption, poverty alleviation, peace and order, at education. Subalit ako ay naniniwala na habang nakaupo si GMA, wala po ni isa sa mga panukalang ito ang natutupad dahil wala sa puso niya ang kapakanan ng mamamayan. Napatunayan na natin ito sa pamamagitan ng anim na taong paghihirap simula ng umupo siya noong 2001. At narinig mismo natin sa “Hello Garci” kung gaano kagahaman sa kapangyarihan si GMA. Wag na po tayong umasa na magbabago sya. Sa madaling salita: walang kapayapaan at walang pag-unlad habang nakaupo si GMA.

Kaya naman kung papalarin at mahalal ako bilang senador, ngayon pa lang ay sasabihin ko na ang boto ko sa impeachment court: GUILTY. Guilty si GMA sa pagsisinungaling, pandaraya at pagnanakaw. Guilty rin sya sa pagpatay, pang-aabuso, pang-aapi, at pagpapahirap sa mga mamamayan.

Ganyan po kahalaga ang boto natin sa darating na halalan. Nais ba nating mapanatili si GMA at magdusa ang bayan habang nakaupo sya? O simulan ang pagbabago sa pamamahala na walang ibang hahantungan kundi ang minimithi nating kapayapaan at kaunlaran.

Tandaan natin na ang kapalaran ng ating bansa ay nasa ating mga kamay.

Mabuhay!!

Trillanes dares Joker to a debate

2007-02-24T02:04:00.000-08:00

Trillanes dares Joker to a debate
02/22/2007 | 06:02 PM

Detained opposition senatorial candidate Navy Lt. s.g. Antonio Trillanes IV challenged his critics Thursday “to be man enough" to face him squarely and give him a chance to answer issues hurled against him.

“In the past several days, I’ve been the target of verbal attacks by some officials and candidates of the administration," Trillanes said in a statement.

“While I expected this type of gutter politics from them, I was hoping that they were at least man enough to let me address their attacks squarely by not opposing my court motion to be allowed access to media."

Trillanes then pleaded: “I want a fair fight."

He also challenged Team Unity senatorial candidate Joker Arroyo to a debate about the country’s problems.

“I am not a debater myself, but I believe this is a way of elevating the level of election campaigning to where it ought to be. May the candidate with the better prescriptions win," he said.

Trillanes said if Joker Arroyo will accept his challenge, he is ready anytime. “If [Arroyo declines], then keep your “trapo" (traditional politician) ways to yourself because it is a disservice to the electorate."

Trillanes, the alleged leader of a group of young military officers who launched a short-lived mutiny in Makati on July 27, 2003, also criticized the harassment being applied by the military to his relatives, friends and supporters.

“They have been subjected to harassment and scare tactics by a few misinformed elements of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines). Whoever is behind these, I beg you to spare them because this violates the ethics of any kind of warfare," he added.

He urged the AFP leadership instead to welcome the possibility of having another former soldier as a legislator since it will bring another voice of the soldiers in the Senate to push for the interest of the officers and enlisted men.

“I also would like to thank the Genuine Opposition (GO) for all their support in the campaign and for standing up for me [amid] accusations. I express my deepest gratitude to all the volunteers who have been helping in the campaign," he said.

According to Trillanes he expects that his candidacy will be a long and difficult fight.

“But be assured my supporters that [if I win] I will lead you to no less than a victory for our country and people," he said.-Fidel Jimenez,GMANews.TV

AFP orders probe on soldiers' e-campaign for Trillanes

2007-02-24T02:01:00.000-08:00

AFP orders probe on soldiers' e-campaign for Trillanes
AMITA LEGASPI,GMANews.TV
02/20/2007 | 06:02 PM

Armed Forces chief Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr ordered on Tuesday an investigation on soldiers suspected of helping through the Internet, the election campaign of detained Lieutenant SG Antonio Trillanes IV.

Radio dzBB reported Esperon wondered how Trillanes was able to post messages in his blogs and Friendster accounts when there was no phone line and internet connection inside his detention cell.

Trillanes, who filed his candidacy to run for the Senate on February 6, is detained at Fort Bonifacio in Taguig City.

Esperon said the resigned Navy officer would not be able to do it without the help of sympathetic soldiers.

Trillanes’ friends, who identified themselves as a group of military personnel, earlier dedicated a website for the detained Navy officer to boost his campaign.

During the filing of COC, Trillanes said he is upbeat about his chances to secure a Senate seat despite his detention. "I have many supporters, we will launch a proxy campaign all over the country," Trillanes said, adding, “we will maximize technology – TV, radio, print, text (SMS) and the Internet."

In his blogspot, (http://magdaloparasapagbabago.blogspot.com/) Trillanes said: “More than three years ago, my fellow soldiers and I stood for our convictions and pushed for reforms to pursue our collective vision: to live in a society where there is no corruption… where the streets are safe and the needs of the poor are addressed adequately…where every citizen is provided with the best education, sufficient health care, and genuine public service."

He said this “vision has sustained me throughout the years" and that “now… is the time to carry forth this vision."

Meanwhile, in his Friendster account that caters more to the youth, (www.friendster/trillanes), he posted that his hobbies are tennis, badminton, chess, basketball, malling with his family and watching movies.

His favorite books are True Believer, American Ceasar, Brotherhood of the Rose, Books of Robert Ludlum and Frederick Forsyth.

Trillanes' favorite songs are those by the Side A Band and Mike Francis.

Esperon reiterated his warning that charges of violation of articles of war will be filed against soldiers found conspiring with Trillanes.

Dzbb quoted Esperon as saying that the AFP will not allow Trillanes to go out of his detention cell to campaign. He said Trillanes still faces charges before the general court martial and the Makati regional trial court.

On July 27, 2003, a group of 321 armed soldiers led by Trillanes, who called themselves Magdalo, took over the Oakwood Premier hotel in Ayala, Makati to protest the alleged massive corruption in the government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

The mutiny ended in 18 hours after the soldiers failed to get support from the public and the leadership of the armed forces. The soldiers, including Trillanes, surrendered peacefully and were charged in a general court martial.

Esperon earlier issued an order barring any member of the AFP, including civilian employees, from either endorsing or campaigning publicly, in any form, for a particular candidate to any elective position.

"These guidelines were set not to infringe on the individual rights of our soldiers and employees but rather to ensure that the AFP as an organization remains to be non-partisan," Esperon said.
GMANews.TV

DOJ blocks Trillanes plea for media interviews

2007-02-24T01:59:00.000-08:00

FROM WWW.GMANEWS.TV
DOJ blocks Trillanes plea for media interviews
02/22/2007 | 04:08 PM

The Department of Justice (DOJ) asked Thursday the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) to reject the motion filed by alleged renegade junior officer Lt. s.g. Antonio Trillanes IV for full media exposure so he can air his government platform during the campaign period.

Trillanes, currently detained at Fort Bonifacio in Taguig for coup d’etat and for alleged violation of Article of War 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), is running for senator under the Genuine Opposition (GO) coalition.

The junior officer, who led the July 27, 2003 mutiny by seizing a plush hotel-apartment in Makati, invoked the freedom of the press in his plea to be interviewed by members of media.

In his motion for full media access, Trillanes said as a detainee he has not lost his constitutional rights.

He also cited the Sibal’s “Philippine Legal Encyclopedia (1991)" to claim that he has an absolute “right to run and campaign."

In a four-page rejoinder, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera said although Trillanes can be presumed innocent until proven guilty by the court, the junior officer is not entitled to freedom of the press because he is not a member of media.

Navera said “Trillanes cannot point where in the 1987 Constitution his absolute right to run and campaign is provided for."

“In fact, while he assails the prosecution’s supposed self-serving arguments, his failure to cite an explicit Supreme Court doctrine in this regard, constrains him to make his own self-serving interpretations about Sibal’s definition of the right to vote," Navera said.

Trillanes cannot also compare himself to the late senator Benigno Aquino who was allowed in 1978 by dictator Ferdinand Marcos to be interviewed on television and to campaign through media during the martial law regime, according to Navera.

“The undersigned State Prosecutors were not even born during the dark days of martial law and counsel for accused Trillanes’ childhood memory of free access to the media given to Senator Aquino cannot be seriously considered as evidence nor given judicial notice," Navera said.

Navera said the scales of justice have been tilted since December last year in favor of Trillanes.

“He has been allowed to register as a voter in Caloocan City. The prosecution allowed him to personally file his certificate of candidacy for senator at the Commission on Elections (Comelec). The prosecution relented and allowed accused Trillanes to pick his preferred date of filing his certificate of candidacy," Navera said.

Navera said nothing will satisfy Trillanes when it comes to his supposedly absolute right to run and campaign.- GMANews.TV

2007-02-13T01:16:00.000-08:00

TRILLANES!

WALANG KAPARES!

SENADOR!

2007-02-05T07:17:00.000-08:00

SA PANAHON NA ANG BAYAN AY NABABALOT SA PAG-AALINLANGAN- MAY TAONG NANINDIGAN PARA SA KATOTOHANAN- MAGING KAPALIT MA'Y SARILI NIYANG KALAYAAN- TRILLANES!

PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

2006-12-25T01:27:00.000-08:00

By Antonio Trillanes IV

ANTI-CORRUPTION

· A bill that would reengineer government processes to reduce bureaucratic red tape and minimize the points of contact between the public official and client. This would hasten business transactions, encourage economic activities and minimize opportunities for bribery and extortion practices.

· A bill that would overhaul and rationalize the auditing processes of the Commission on Audit (COA) to make it more effective as an anti-corruption watchdog.

· A bill providing for a new and more comprehensive “Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act” that would promote accountability and transparency in public service(e.g. all public officials shall sign a waiver of their rights under the Bank Secrecy Law) and governance and would increase to the maximum possible extent the administrative and criminal liabilities of corrupt government officials.

· A bill that would provide for automatic and periodic wage review and increase for all government employees, which would be based on the inflation rate within every 3-year period. This is a proven effective anti-corruption policy employed by other countries. It also intends to provide for a decent standard of living for all government employees as well as to attract qualified people from the private sector to join government.

ANTI-POVERTY

· A bill creating a permanent anti-poverty commission with tenured leadership with automatic, adequate and independent funding that would draft and implement strategic, long-term and comprehensive anti-poverty and poverty alleviation programs of the Government.

· A bill providing for a comprehensive school-based feeding program in the ‘poorest of the poor’ communities of the country to fight malnutrition and poverty as well as help promote and encourage regular school attendance by poor school children.

· A bill that would promote and fund microfinance to provide small and medium enterprises, cooperatives and micro entrepreneurs with adequate and affordable credit. This would encourage economic activities and create income and employment for the poor.

PEACE & ORDER

· A bill that would define the peace & order policy of the country.

· A new AFP modernization bill that is more responsive to the needs of the organization and of the nation and which would create a leaner but more effective Armed Forces.

· A resolution that would recommend the amendments of the constitutional provision requiring all AFP officers for promotion to the rank of colonel or higher, to go through the Commission of Appointments. Instead, only the promotions for the positions of AFP Chief of Staff and the three (3) service commanders would pass through the CA. This would insulate senior officers from members of Congress who seek political accommodations and concessions in exchange for confirmation. Also included in this resolution is the fixing of the term of office of the AFP chief of staff and the major service commanders to three (3) years. This would prevent the internal politics among generals caused by the ‘revolving door’ policy employed by the past and present administrations; help restore meritocracy in the AFP promotion system; and ensure that policies and reforms are institutionalized.

· A bill that would reduce the number of AFP generals. This would significantly streamline the organization and free up more resources that could be re-channeled to operating units; for materiel acquisition; and morale and welfare needs.

· A bill that would provide for a complete reorganization, re-training and re-indoctrination of the PNP. This intends to professionalize its ranks to make it a better law enforcement arm of the State.

· A Bill that would increase the salaries of all AFP personnel to a level befitting their noble service to the country

· A bill that would increase the combat pay of AFP groud troops ( i.e. Army and Marines) from P240/month to 25% of their base pay.

· A bill that would increase the subsistence allowance of all AFP personnel from P60.00/day to at least P150/day

EDUCATION, HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES

· A bill that would create at least one (1) state college or university in every region to afford poor but deserving students adequate opportunities to finish tertiary education.

· A bill that would make college education more accessible to the poor by strengthening and providing more funds to the state scholarship system and to the ‘study now, pay later’ program of the Government.

· A bill that would promote, as well as regulate informal education, vocational and technical education as well as distance learning methods.

· A bill that would raise the salaries and wages of public school teachers, professors and lecturers of state colleges and universities to a level befitting the dignity of their exalted professions.

· A bill which would provide for the creation and/or strengthening of health centers in every barangay with adequate funding in order to provide basic health care services (including mandatory inoculation) as well as health education with emphasis on disease prevention, detection and control, pre-natal and child care and basic family planning education (with due regard to religious belief of the participants).

· Through the General Appropriations bill, prioritize and allocate more funds and resources for education (textbooks, school buildings, subsidy of state colleges, and hiring of more teachers), anti-poverty programs (MBN-type programs, livelihood projects, street children education and rehabilitation), health care (medicine, vaccinations, disease control and prevention, reproductive health, home for the aged/disabled), mass housing, basic infrastructure (farm-to-market roads, national highways, bridges, ports and airports) and agricultural modernization.

Trillanes re-registered in Caloocan

2006-12-10T03:56:00.000-08:00

Navy Lt. Senior Grade Antonio Trillanes IV finally re-registered self as voter in his hometown in Caloocan City Sunday (Dec.10).

Trillanes attempted to register last Friday Dec.8, but he was not allowed because of the policy that no registration is being done on Friday and Saturday.

Trillanes gamely took pictures with his kababayan and supporters.

Trillanes Statement

2006-12-10T03:48:00.000-08:00

I would like to officially announce my participation in next year’s elections. I have arrived at this decision because I simply cannot helplessly watch the incessant rape of our people’s dignity and our country’s wealth. I also would like to pursue the advocacies we started three years ago, albeit in another forum. Finally, I believe the elections are the only peaceful avenue left for the Filipinos to effect change in leadership of this country.

However, in light of the new developments in the House of Representatives where the Administration seems to be hell-bent on pushing for Charter Change regardless of all the legal barriers against it, even this avenue may be taken away from us.

I am therefore calling on the people to be vigilant in the coming days to ensure that our right to choose our own leaders are not trampled upon. WALANG PROBLEMA SA SISTEMA. ANG PROBLEMA AY ANG MGA TAONG NAGPAPATAKBO NG SISTEMA.

MABUHAY ANG PILIPINO!

LTSG ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV PN

Trillanes gets leave to register in Caloocan

2006-12-10T03:33:00.000-08:00

Trillanes gets leave to register in Caloocan

Article posted December 8, 2006

After getting a court order for it, Magdalo leader Navy Lt. Senior Grade Antonio Trillanes IV finally got out of detention Friday to register with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) as a voter in his home city of Caloocan.

But there was one major hitch – the Comelec does not allow registration on Friday and Saturday, and did not make an exception for Trillanes and many voters lined up that day. In its interview with election officer Arlene Ramos, radio station dzBB reported that the Comelec does not entertain registration on Friday and Saturday and that allowing Trillanes and the others to do would could result in a technicality.

Ramos also declined Trillanes' requests to at least complete the other requirements such as fingerprinting and filling up of forms, the same radio report said. A disappointed Trillanes said he would try to get a court order to allow him to return, possibly next week. "I was allowed to register here due to a court order.

I registered here because I was born and raised here," the detained Navy junior officer told dzBB radio in an interview. Asked why he seemed to have no uniformed military escorts with him, Trillanes merely said in Filipino: "I have many escorts."

At the same time, Trillanes, who affirmed his plans to run for senator next year, called for nationwide vigilance against the moves of the administration-dominated House of Representatives to convene Congress next week into a constituent assembly aimed at introducing changes to the 1987 Constitution.

"We must watch the developments at the Lower House. It is violating all rules of decency," he said. Trillanes, one of the hardcore leaders of the Magdalo group that staged the short-lived July 27, 2003 Oakwood mutiny, is facing court martial for alleged violation of the Articles of War and coup charges before the Makati regional trial court in connection with the failed uprising. He is currently detained at the Bonifacio Naval Station inside the Philippine Marine headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.

Trillanes’ Estrellita, one of those who accompanied him to the Comelec, said she was apprehensive about her son’s political plans. "I am worried," she said, adding that she had been trying to dissuade her son from entering the political ring. The political opposition had said that Trillanes is being considered to be included in its senatorial slate in time for the May 2007 midterm elections. - GMANews.TV

PREVENTING MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

2006-12-03T05:55:00.000-08:00

PREVENTING
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
A Policy Issue Paper

By:
LTSG ANTONIO F TRILLANES IV PN
May 2004

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The occupation of Oakwood Hotel by protesting junior officers and men last July 27, 2003 placed the issue of military interventions at the forefront of public policy analysis specifically, how best to prevent them from recurring. This policy issue paper reviews the present policies adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions, and assesses whether these should be pursued or not.

THE PROBLEM: MILITARY INTERVENTION

Military intervention is an act made by active members of the AFP, outside the conventions of the chain of command, with the intent of disrupting the political status quo, in the pursuit of their political cause.

Military interventions, not to mention its sometimes-bloody consequences, have debilitating effects on our economic and political stability. Given our present precarious social-economic-political state - we cannot afford another military intervention.

There were common/significant causes extracted from the nine major military interventions our country has so far experienced. These causes are categorized into two, internal and external.

Internal causes are those attributable to or directly affecting the military organization; while, external causes are those attributable to factors external to the military. The internal causes were: (1) corruption in the AFP; (2) inept AFP leadership; (3) political patronage in promotions; (4) lack of logistical support for men in the field; (5) low pay; and (6) poor medical/health services. While the external causes were: (1) corruption in government; (2) incompetent leaders in the administration; (3) failure of the administration to deliver basic services; (4) widespread poverty; (5) state-sponsored terrorism; and (6) electoral fraud by the administration.

ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

The present policies being adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions are the recommendations made by the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission (FFFC).

Based on the evaluation using the criterion of political viability, most of the present policies were assessed to be unresponsive to the underlying causes of the Oakwood Incident and therefore, will not prevent future military interventions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Continue with the implementation of the following FFFC recommendations, which were found to be responsive or useful:

A. Creation of a cabinet-level agency (e.g. The Presidential Adviser on Military Affairs) directly under the Office of the President. It should have oversight powers and clear inter-department relationships with all concerned to prevent over-lapping of functions. This office will also conduct the appropriate policy researches to further flesh out the more complicated problems enumerated below as well as other internal causes not raised by this paper.

B. The propositions regarding the RSBS, Procurement System, AFP Modernization, AFP Medical Services, and AFP Housing.

2. Review the other FFFC recommendations as to their responsiveness to the causes of military interventions.

3. Conduct policy researches on the following:

A. Eradication of corruption in the AFP.
B. Rehabilitation of RSBS.
C. Strict application of meritocracy in the AFP promotions system.
D. Uplifting of the standard of living of the AFP personnel through:

1) Salary increase or non-monetary benefits such as, tax reductions/exemptions, reduction of RSBS contributions, rice subsidy, C-130 flights or ship passes for soldiers going on R & R, etc.
2) Improvement of medical and health services.
3) Mass housing.

E. Streamlining of the AFP bureaucracy.

4. Practice good governance to address the external causes of military intervention.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AdMU - Ateneo de Manila University
AFP - Armed Forces of the Philippines
AO - Administrative Order
C-in-C - Commander-in-Chief
CMF - centrally-managed funds
CPP - Communist Party of the Philippines
CSAFP - Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines
DND - Department of National Defense
DOJ - Department of Justice
EDSA - Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue
FFFC - Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission
GCFI - Guardian Center Foundation Inc.
GHQ - General Headquarters
HQ - headquarters
ISAFP - Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the
Philippines
JUSMAG - Joint United States Military Assistance Group
MAB - Mactan Air Base
MBD - Makati Business District
NICA - National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
NOVAI - Navy Officers’ Village Association Inc.
NPA - New People’s Army
NSC - National Security Council
NUC - National Unification Commission
PAF - Philippine Air Force
PMA - Philippine Military Academy
PN - Philippine Navy
RA - Republic Act
RAM - Reform the Armed Forces Movement
R&R - rest and recreation
RSBS - Retirement Separation Benefit System
SND - Secretary of National Defense
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

PREVENTING MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

BACKGROUND: THE OAKWOOD INCIDENT

On July 27, 2003, the Filipino Nation became a witness to another socio-political phenomenon – the Oakwood Incident. More than 300 officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) holed themselves up in a posh hotel in Makati to protest against the Arroyo Administration for massive corruption; selling of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the state; state-sponsored terrorist acts; and widespread poverty.

This incident is the latest among numerous military interventions experienced by our country since the first one happened in December 1970, when then 1Lt Victor N Corpus raided the armory of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) en route to his eventual defection to the New People’s Army. The Oakwood Incident also happened two and a half years after EDSA II and almost fourteen years after the bloody 1989 coup attempt. With the latest incident, a question now lingers in the minds of a lot of Filipinos – “Is our country forever condemned to have these military interventions?”

This policy issue paper reviews the present policies adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions, and assesses whether these should be pursued or not.

SCOPE AND SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM

The effects of military interventions to our country, not to mention its sometimes-bloody consequences, are debilitating to our economy and gravely affect our country’s political stability. During the 1989 coup attempt alone, in addition to the human casualties, the combined financial losses suffered by the economy ranged from P800 million to P 1 billion (Davide, 1990: 378 and according to Sec. Manuel A. Roxas II, it “brought down our economy to nearly zero growth” (PDI, 2003: 1). Davide further wrote, “the loss of lives, loss of confidence and damage to our international image are worth far more than the financial losses” (Davide, 1990: 378).

As for the Oakwood Incident, just four days after, the peso fell to a new four-month low while stocks also fell to its lowest level within the past four weeks thereby reflecting investors concerns over political and economic uncertainties (PDI Editorial, 2003: 8). According to columnist Armando Doronilla, it “unleashed a new blizzard of uncertainty over the economic and political horizons” (Doronilla, 2003: 9). Although the incident was brief with no bloodshed or damage to property, “it contributed to the projection of the Philippines as an unsafe, unstable and crisis-prone country” (Feliciano, 2003: Introduction).

While it is also true that history had been kind to two successful military interventions (EDSA I and II), the conditions that followed these exercises were not marked with peace and progress either. On the contrary, post-EDSA I and II were remembered for the attempts to restore the toppled administrations such as the Manila Hotel Incident; the GMA-7 coup attempt; and the Black Saturday Mutiny to restore Pres Marcos, and the EDSA III Incident (although not a military intervention) to restore Pres Estrada. So, whether it is successful or not, a military intervention will produce a climate of political and economic instability which retards the country’s growth and will sow division among the people.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The problem addressed in this paper is how best to prevent military interventions. While the issue addressed is whether to pursue the policies presently being adopted by the Arroyo Administration to prevent military interventions.

In addressing this issue we will extract the root causes of past interventions in the Philippines and we will compare these with the present policies to determine if they are, indeed, responsive. If not, alternatives will be proposed to fill-up policy gaps and come up with a more responsive and, ultimately, a more effective policy.

ACTORS/STAKEHOLDERS

The following are the actors/stakeholders of this policy:

1. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

The essence of any military intervention is obviously the military, in this case, the AFP. Thus, in this policy, the AFP and its personnel are the main recipients.
It is a safe assumption that no soldier in the AFP entered the service to become a rebel, much less a troublemaker who would want to drag his own country down. Obviously, the motivation to break away from the system is nurtured in the course of his career based on what he has witnessed or experienced. There are different motivations or causes cited by previous participants and some have been common to the different interventions. This is where a responsive policy comes in and hopefully, addresses these causes so that the confusion about their roles never arises even under different circumstances.

2. President

The President is solely responsible for the implementation of this policy. As such, he is required to have a clear vision of what he wants his country to be. He also needs to have a high level of political will, unquestionable moral integrity, and an honest desire to serve the people.

The failure to implement this policy will open up his administration to interventionists and maybe rightly so, for he had failed to fulfill his mandate to serve, protect and uplift the lives of the people. But as what was discussed above regarding the dire economic consequences should this happen, the President, through the different government agencies, must ensure that this policy gets implemented.

Ultimately, the survival of not only his administration is at stake, but, more importantly, that of the State and Democracy itself. In fact, if we are to go by the events of the ’87 and ’89 coup attempts, even the President’s own life is at risk.

3. Business Sector

One of the biggest losers in any military intervention (both successful and failed) is the business sector. That is why it should be highly interested in any move to eradicate the problem. It should also be more participative in overseeing that this policy gets the necessary support it needs to be implemented properly. And since the business sector itself is a party to the prevailing social injustice being experienced by the people, it must start subscribing to certain business ethics that will encourage benevolence within the sector and will also do away with the exploitation of the masses.

4. The People

At the end of the day, it is the Filipino people in general that stand to lose most from the failure of this policy. Aside, from the direct losses to lives and property that they may absorb as collateral damage, they also stand to lose much should the economy falter as a result of a failed military intervention.

Generally, the public have grown apathetic regarding this issue because they feel that, either way, they would still have to contend with the harsh realities of daily living. This was proven to them by both the successful and failed interventions.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVE

The goals of this policy are: (1) to maintain political and economic stability in our country; (2) to promote social justice to our people; and (3) to breed a truly professional AFP. While, the objective of this policy is to directly address both the internal and external causes of military intervention to prevent its recurrence.

MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS

This policy proposes the prevention of military interventions; therefore, the ultimate measure of effectiveness can only be the non-recurrence of such activities in the future. But since the future is infinite, this policy is time-bound within the term of the administration that chooses to implement it. Ideally, it should be implemented for as long as Democracy exists in our country. But given the kind of public administration and politics we have, it is very rare that a policy, even a good one, gets institutionalized.

EVALUATION CRITERION

It can be deduced from the discussions above that any effort to prevent military interventions should address all its direct causes. The rationale being, if there were no more causes to justify military intervention then, this will be prevented from recurring. Considering the psyche of AFP officers and men, and the environment from which they operate, the cause is very important, for this is what they will risk everything, even their lives, for.

The potential interventionists in the AFP ranks are no mercenaries. Neither would a soldier join just for the fun of it. Therefore, without a valid cause, it is highly improbable that a military intervention could be launched. This, in theory, is the approach in preventing military interventions.

From the description of the approach to the problem, it is very clear that the sole evaluating criterion applicable is political viability specifically, responsiveness. As defined by Patton and Sawicki: “Responsiveness is related to acceptability and appropriateness and involves the target group’s perception of whether the policy or program will meet its needs” (Patton, 1993: 216). It is with this criterion that the present efforts to solve the problem will be evaluated on. Likewise, if necessary, responsiveness will also be the basis in the formulation of other alternatives.

It is worth noting however, that based on the precedents set by EDSA I & II, the potential solutions should not prevent future military interventions that may be necessary, in only extreme cases (e.g. oppressive, corrupt and inept administrations and administrations that resort to electoral fraud to stay in power), to protect the people and the state, as stated in the 1987 Constitution.

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

THE ROLE OF THE AFP

In discussing military interventions, we must first know the specific limitations of the AFP and its defined role in the state. The role of modern armed forces is primarily to subdue or prepare to subdue the enemies of the state, particularly external aggressors. But since the Philippines is a third world country, the AFP has other equally important roles: (1) providing stability to the political status quo, demonstrated through its role in the maintenance of law and order, and counter-insurgency; and (2) assisting in national development efforts (Davide, 1990: 10-11).

According to Conrado de Quiros: “the Army combined defense and police functions, mandated as it was to secure the state against external and internal attacks and to maintain peace and order” (de Quiros, 1990:26).

To appreciate the bounds within which the AFP is allowed to operate, we shall refer to its mandate as defined in the 1987 Constitution. As stated in Sec.3 of Art. II of the Constitution: “The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and State.” The intention and spirit of this provision is to give constitutional mandate to the AFP to subvert an oppressive, corrupt and inept government, which is detrimental to the safety of the people and the survival of the state. Apparently, the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately inserted this because they were aware of the crucial role of the AFP in overthrowing Pres Ferdinand Marcos.

The delicate part however, is the subjective interpretation of this constitutional clause. As Davide wrote: “In essence, it is not the mission that pushes the military to intervene. Rather, it is how the officer corps defines and interprets the mission of the armed forces, which may give rise to the phenomenon of military interference in the political arena (Davide, 1990: 11).”According to Navy Capt Proceso Maligalig PN (Ret.), a participant in the 1989 coup attempt: “The military or ‘warrior’ class must step in to preserve and protect the State if and when the civilian counterpart fails or abdicates the responsibility for credible governance” (Coronel, 1990: 55).

All doubts about the interpretation, however, were clarified during EDSA II, when then AFP Chief of Staff Gen Angelo Reyes broke the chain of command and withdrew support from his Commander-in-Chief Pres Joseph Estrada citing this same constitutional provision. With the Supreme Court ruling and global recognition that followed, formally legitimizing the Arroyo Administration, military intervention is now justified, in extreme cases, as a means to change a democratically-elected administration. Intellectual honesty dictates that this is a historical fact and a legal precedent. Hence, the parameters that applied during the decision of then Gen Reyes must also be applicable throughout time unless, this provision is changed or removed from the Constitution.

Another constitutional provision defining the role of the AFP is Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (1), where it states: “All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.” Again, this has been interpreted both ways. Those in the administration often recite this line to tame the AFP and make it do their bidding. On the other hand, the interventionists in the AFP use this line to call on the others to join them in invoking the Art II, Sec. 3 provision as stated above.

But again this has been clarified by the legitimization by the Supreme Court and the international community of the actions of then Gen Reyes.

MILITARY INTERVENTION DEFINED

Military intervention is defined as an act made by active members of the AFP, outside the conventions of the chain of command, with the intent of disrupting the political status quo, in the pursuit of their political cause. According to an AdMU paper: “The term ‘military intervention’ is habitually associated with a coup d’etat or a cuartelazo or a golpe de estado. These are, however, only types of military intervention – albeit the most extreme form” (AdMU, 2001). Military intervention can come in various forms: coup d’etat, rebellion, mutiny, sedition, protest action (e.g. the Oakwood Incident), and even through a simple press statement, as in the case of the Kawal Incident.

From this definition, we can delineate military intervention from other incidents involving the military. For example, a large group of AFP personnel who protested against their commander for his autocratic style of leadership is not a form of military intervention in the sense that it was done for purely professional reasons. Martial Law is also not a form of military intervention since the military under this political set-up is still operating under the AFP chain of command.

CAUSES OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

According to Davide: “Motives for military intervention are varied and complicated. No single factor can easily be pointed out as the sole cause for intervention. It is oftentimes a conjunction of motives” (Davide, 1990: 4). Thus, in extracting the causes that motivated some members of the AFP to intervene in Philippine politics, we will categorize them into two - internal and external. Internal causes are those attributable to or directly affecting the military organization; while, external causes are those attributable to factors external to the military (Davide 1990: 9).

1. December 1970 PMA Armory Raid

In December 1970, 1Lt Victor N. Corpus led NPA rebels in a raid of an armory inside the Philippine Military Academy (Corpus, 1989: write-up). They carted away hundreds of infantry weapons before disappearing into the communist underground (McCoy 1999: 198). He eventually surrendered to the government in 1976 (Corpus, 1989: write-up).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The misuse of the AFP by politicians against the interests of the people (Corpus, 1989: write-up).

B. Graft and corruption in the AFP (McCoy, 1999: 197).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The oligarchic structure of the Philippine society (McCoy, 1999: 197).
B. The leftist influences on 1Lt Corpus by the communist youth group, Kabataan Makabayan, (which he joined after graduating from PMA) and its ideologue, Jose Ma. Sison (McCoy, 1999: 197).

2. February 1986 EDSA I Mutiny

On February 22, 1986, then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile along with General Fidel Ramos and the members of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) barricaded themselves inside the Ministry of National Defense building in Camp Aguinaldo and, thereafter, withdrew support from Pres Ferdinand Marcos. This triggered the so-called “people power”, which eventually toppled the Marcos Administration on Feb 26.

According to Escalante, while many wished “to perpetuate a romanticized, scented image of EDSA I”, it “never was a revolution. It was a pocket mutiny that grew into a localized revolt, drawing the participation, cumulatively, of perhaps no more than five percent of the population (Escalante, 2000: 1).”

EDSA I was the first successful military intervention in the history of our country.

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP (Davide, 1990: 120; and Coronel 1990: 51).
B. Political patronage in the AFP promotions system (Davide, 1990: 120; McCoy, 1999: 232; and Coronel, 1990: 56).
C. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field (Davide 1990: 120).
D. Low pay of AFP personnel (Coronel, 1990: 51).
E. The schism between the officers belonging to the camp of Gen. Fabian Ver and those who did not (Coronel, 1990:51 and de Quiros, 1990: 41).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The electoral fraud committed by Pres Marcos during the February 7, 1986 Snap Presidential Elections (Davide, 1990: 124).
B. Corruption and inefficiency in government (de Quiros, 1990: 41, 44, 45).
C. The alleged attempt to eliminate Enrile and RAM members by the forces of Gen Ver (de Quiros, 1990: 42; McCoy, 1999: 231; and Davide, 1990: 119, 122).
D. The deteriorating political and economic conditions after the Ninoy Aquino assassination in 1983 (Davide, 1990: 122; and Escalante, 2000: 15).
E. The consolidation of power by Pres Marcos through the subservience of the Batasang Pambansa; muzzling of the press; the weakening of the judiciary; and the total control of the military (Davide, 1990: 55 and de Quiros, 1990: 40).
F. The widespread social unrest due to dire economic conditions (de Quiros, 1990: 38).

3. July 1986 Manila Hotel Incident

In July 1986, Marcos loyalists occupied Manila Hotel, the symbolic center of party politics, to proclaim former Senator Arturo Tolentino, Marcos’ vice-presidential running mate, as Acting President of the new government (McCoy, 1999: 266-267). At least 490 military officers and men, and some 5,000 civilian Marcos loyalists were involved in the rebellion. They surrendered 37 hours later (Davide, 1990: 135-141).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Discriminatory treatment of AFP personnel connected with the Marcos regime (Davide, 1990: 204).
B. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Adminstration against the CPP-NPA (Davide, 1990: 136).
C. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Davide, 1990: 136).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The counter-revolutionary fervor of Marcos loyalists (Davide, 1990: 137).
B. Widespread social unrest (Davide, 1990: 136).

4. January 1987 GMA-7 Incident

On the early morning of January 27, 1987, AFP personnel loyal to deposed Pres Marcos struck various military and civilian targets that culminated in the siege of the GMA-7 compound in Quezon City (Davide, 1990: 158-165).
After almost three days, the rebels led by Col Oscar Canlas PAF agreed to lay down their arms. One rebel soldier died and thirty-five people were injured during the incident. GMA-7 was also estimated to have lost at least P3 million in direct damages (Davide, 1990: 161, 165).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Discriminatory treatment of AFP personnel connected with the Marcos regime (Davide, 1990: 161, 204).
B. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Administration against the CPP-NPA (Davide, 1990: 161).
C. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Davide, 1990: 164).
D. The ill treatment of the AFP by the Aquino Administration (Davide, 1990: 163).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The counter-revolutionary fervor of Marcos loyalists (Davide, 1990: 164).
B. The worsening political situation caused by the killing of protesting farmers in the so-called “Mendiola Massacre” on January 22, 1987 (Davide, 1990: 158).

5. April 1987 “Black Saturday” Incident

On 18 April 1987, 13 enlisted personnel, all members of the Guardian Brotherhood, led by TSgt Ernesto Librado, forced their entry through Fort Bonifacio and went straight to the military stockade to free 42 military detainees, most of whom participated in the January 27 GMA-7 incident. They then raided an armory before barricading themselves inside the Headquarters Philippine Army building in Fort Bonifacio (Davide, 1990: 168-169).
The siege lasted 20 hours before the rebels agreed to surrender leaving one rebel dead and seven wounded (Davide, 1990: 168-170).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Administration against the CPP-NPA (Davide, 1990: 170).
B. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Davide, 1990: 170).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The counter-revolutionary fervor of Marcos loyalists (Davide, 1990: 168).
B. Corruption and inefficiency in government (Davide, 1990: 170).
C. The volatility of the political situation brought about by the alarming power outages; water shortage; escalation of insurgency-related incidents; successive bombing incidents in Metro Manila; and the upcoming national and local elections (Davide, 1990: 167).

6. August 1987 Coup Attempt

On the early hours of August 28, 1987, more than 2,000 officers and men, spearheaded by then Col. Gregorio Honasan and the RAM, simultaneously attacked various military and civilian objectives around the country, including the Malacanang Palace, in a coup attempt against the Aquino Administration.

While most of the targets (except Malacanang) were initially occupied by the rebels, the failure of subsequent reinforcements to arrive; and the lack of support from the private sector forced them to capitulate (Davide, 1990: 175-200).

The bloody end of the coup attempt came 36 hours later leaving 53 people dead and more than 200 wounded (Coronel, 1990: 83). Damage to property surpassed millions of pesos, to include the burning of the General Headquarters building in Camp Aguinaldo (Davide, 1990: 200).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP (Coronel 1990: 52, 81).
B. Political patronage in the AFP promotions system (Coronel, 1990: 51; and Davide, 1990: 204).
C. Inept AFP leadership (Coronel, 1990: 52, 81).
D. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field (Davide 1990: 204).
E. Low pay of AFP personnel (Coronel, 1990: 51, 80; Davide, 1990: 204; and Miranda, 1987: 1).
F. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Administration against the CPP-NPA (Coronel, 1990: 70; Davide, 1990: 205; and Miranda, 1987: 1).
G. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Coronel, 1990: 52, 70, 80; and Davide, 1990: 205).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Corruption and incompetence in government (Coronel, 1990: 51, 70, 81).
B. The political instability and social unrest brought about by the dim prospects of agrarian reform; the spate of bombings in Metro Manila; the 80-centavo increase in oil prices; the conduct of Welgang Bayan by militant labor groups and student organizations (Davide, 1990: 176).
C. The failure of the government to deliver basic services especially in the rural areas (Davide, 1990: 470, 532).

7. December 1989 Coup Attempt*

On November 29, 1989, a dozen men of the 14th Scout Ranger Company led by Capt Jaime Junio prematurely attacked and destroyed a military communications facility in Tagaytay City (Yabes, 1991: 166-168) in what is to be the unofficial start of the biggest and bloodiest coup attempt in Philippine history.

Starting in the early hours of December 1, almost 3,000 rebel forces led by at least 7 generals, 21 full colonels and 441 other officers (Davide, 1990: 439-440) simultaneously attacked Villamor Air Base, Fort Bonifacio, Camp Aguinaldo, PTV-4, North and South Harbors, Sangley Point, and Mactan Air Base (MAB) in Cebu. The Manila Domestic, Legazpi and Bacolod Airports were also briefly occupied by the rebels with the intent of flying in reinforcements. By daybreak, rebel T-28 Tora-Tora planes bombed/strafed Malacanang Palace and Camp Crame (Davide, 1990: 260-369).

But soon after the rebel air assets were destroyed and more government reinforcements arrived in Metro Manila, the tide began to turn. On December 2, the rebel Scout Rangers were forced to seek refuge at the Makati Business District (MBD) while the rebel Marine forces decided to leave Villamor Air Base to proceed and capture Camp Aguinaldo. However, after several futile attempts to penetrate the camp’s defenses, the battered rebel Marine forces were forced to surrender on December 3 (Davide, 1990: 260-369).

By December 3, the positions previously occupied by the rebel forces were retaken by government troops until only the MBD and MAB in Cebu remained in rebels’ hands. Eventually, the Scout Rangers in MBD agreed to “return to barracks” on December 7, while the rebel forces in MAB led by Gen Jose Comendador surrendered on December 9 (Davide, 1990: 284, 368).
In all, the coup attempt claimed the lives of 99 persons, of which 31 were from government side, 17 from the rebel forces, and 51 civilians. 570 persons were also wounded in the skirmishes (Davide, 1990: 376).

INTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP (Coronel 1990: 52, 81; Davide, 1990: 470; and Guingona, 1989: 27).
B. Inept AFP leadership (Coronel, 1990: 52, 81).
C. Political patronage in the AFP promotions system (Davide, 1990: 470; and Coronel, 1990: 51, 56).
D. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field (Davide 1990: 470).
E. Low pay of AFP personnel (Coronel, 1990: 51, 80; Davide, 1990: 470; and Miranda, 1987: 1).
F. The “soft-stance” of the Aquino Adminstration against the CPP-NPA (Coronel, 1990: 70; and Davide, 1990: 471).
G. The presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet (Coronel, 1990: 52, 70, 80; and Davide, 1990: 471).

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. Graft and corruption in government (Coronel, 1990: 53; Davide, 1990: 470; Guingona, 1989: 27; and Salonga, 1989: 71).
B. The failure of the government to deliver basic services especially in the rural areas (Coronel, 1990: 53; Davide, 1990: 470; and Salonga, 1989: 71).
C. Widespread poverty (Davide, 1990: 470).
D. Uneven treatment of human rights violations committed by the AFP and the CPP-NPA (Davide, 1990: 470).
E. Absence of good government (Coronel, 1990: 52; and Davide, 1990: 471).
F. The failure of the government to effectively address the economic problems of the country (Davide, 1990: 471).
G. The lack of genuine reconciliation on the part of the government with the different sectors opposing it (Davide, 1990: 470).
H. The failing economy under the Aquino Administration as shown by the double-digit inflation; high interest rates; severe transport crisis; power failures; fuel price increases; inadequate infrastructure; etc. (UP, 1989).
I. Political instability (Davide, 1990: 221).

*Author’s Note: The Noble rebellion in Mindanao, which happened a few months later, is basically an extension of the 1989 coup attempt and, therefore, had the same internal and external causes.
*Author’s Note: The Noble rebellion in Mindanao, which happened a few months later, is basically an extension of the 1989 coup attempt and, therefore, had the same internal and external causes.

8. January 2001 EDSA II Mutiny

On January 16, 2001, the members of the prosecution panel walked-out at the height of the impeachment trial of then Pres Joseph Estrada when they lost the Senate voting (11 to 10) to open the controversial “second envelope”. The prosecution had claimed that the said envelope contained vital pieces of evidence to link Pres Estrada to the charges of corruption.

This triggered massive protest actions along the EDSA-Ortigas area by civil society groups that eventually, on January 19, forced then Chief of Staff Gen Angelo Reyes, along with the commanders of the three branches of service of the AFP, to withdraw their support from their Commander-in-Chief (Estrada) and bestow it on then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. As a result, Pres Estrada was forced to abdicate the presidency on January 20.

EDSA II was the second successful military intervention in Philippine history.

INTERNAL CAUSES: None.

EXTERNAL CAUSES:

A. The political instability and economic uncertainty brought about by the charges of corruption against Pres Estrada (Symonds, 2001).

B. The perception that Pres Estrada has lost his mandate from the people (Billington, 2002). (This observation was attributed to then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Gen Diomedio Villanueva PA.)

C. The perceived economic difficulties if Pres Estrada remains in power (Symonds, 2001). (This statement was attributed to Philippine Stock Exchange governor Vivian Yuchengco.)

D. The incompetence of Pres Estrada to govern (Sheridan, 2001).

9. July 2003 Oakwood Incident

On the early morning of July 27, 2003, more than 300 officers and men of the AFP occupied the Oakwood Hotel in Makati City to protest against the Arroyo Administration for massive corruption; selling of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the state; state-sponsored terrorist acts; and widespread poverty.

The siege lasted 22 hours and was peacefully resolved only after an agreement was reached where the government will spare all the participants (except 5 members) from prosecution in exchange for their “return to barracks”.

INTERNAL CAUSES (Taken from the interviews with the Oakwood participants):

A. Graft and corruption in the AFP.
B. The selling of arms and ammunition by the AFP to the enemies of the state resulting in the never-ending war with the insurgents and secessionists at the cost of thousands of lives of civilians and AFP personnel.
C. The complicity of Sec. Reyes and Gen Diomedio Villanueva in the “escape” of Abu Sayyaf members through the military cordon during the so-called Lamitan Siege in June 2001.
D. The “revolving door” policy of choosing the AFP Chief of Staff, which resulted to having 6 unproductive Chiefs of Staff in the 3 years of the Arroyo Administration.
E. Political patronage or “bata-bata” system in the promotions of senior military commanders (committed particularly by Secretary Angelo Reyes).
F. Incompetent AFP Commanders resulting in the lack of strategic direction of the AFP.
G. The incompetence and political motivation of then Secretary of National Defense Angelo Reyes.
H. The incompetence and political motivation of then ISAFP Chief Gen Victor Corpus.
I. Lack of logistical support for the officers and men in the field.
J. The issuance of arms and ammunition by AFP commanders to politicians.
K. The turnover of captured MILF camps back to the MILF.
L. The abuse and misappropriation of AFP resources by its commanders.
M. The misuse of the AFP by politicians against the interests of the people.
N. The bankruptcy of RSBS.
O. Very poor medical and health services.
P. Low pay of AFP personnel.
Q. Lack of housing facilities for AFP personnel.
R. Lacking or deteriorating military equipment.
S. The increase of the number of generals, which will further reduce the resources at the front lines.

EXTERNAL CAUSES (Taken from the interviews with the Oakwood participants):

A. Graft and corruption in government.
B. State-sponsored terrorism as detailed in the paper entitled “The Greenbase Exposé” (Trillanes, 2003).
C. The failure of the Arroyo Administration to deliver the promises made at EDSA II.
D. Widespread poverty.
E. The failing economy as manifested by the runaway budget deficit, rising level of unemployment, falling value of the peso, and the rising costs of commodities.

RECAPITULATION:

CAUSE
MILITARY INTERVENTIONs
INTERNAL
PMA
EDSA I
JUL ‘86
GMA
APR 87
AUG ‘87
DEC ‘89
EDSA II
JUL ‘03
1. CORRUPTION IN THE AFP
X
2. INEPT AFP LEADERSHIP
X
3. POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN PROMOTIONS
X
4. LACK OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR MEN IN THE FIELD
X
5. LOW SALARY
X
6. MISUSE OF AFP BY POLITICIANS
X
8. DISCRIMATORY TREATMENT OF MARCOS LOYALISTS
x
9. SOFT STANCE OF ADMINISTRATION VS CPP-NPA
X
10. PRESENCE OF LEFTISTS IN THE AQUINO CABINET
x
11. COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR

EXTERNAL

1. CORRUPTION IN GOV’T
X

2. INCOMPETENT LEADERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION
X
3. FAILURE OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO DELIVER BASIC SERVICES
X
4. POLITICAL INSTABILITY
x
5. ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
X
6. WIDESPREAD POVERTY
X
7. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
X
8. ELECTORAL FRAUD BY THE ADMINISTRATION

ANALYSIS:

From the table above, we can see that the most common internal cause of military interventions is the corruption in the AFP, which was raised five times. While, four causes were tied at four each and these are: inept AFP leaders; political patronage in promotions; lack of logistical support to the men in the field; and low pay.

The perceived soft-stance of the Aquino Administration towards the CPP-NPA; and the perceived presence of leftists in the Aquino Cabinet; were also raised five times, and while they were applicable only to the Aquino regime, this should highlight the aversion of the AFP to “weak” and left-leaning leadership.

As for the external causes, we can see that among those that ran high with the participants were: political instability (8 times); corruption in government (7 times); and economic instability (7 times). Other, common causes were: failure of the incumbent administration to deliver basic social services to the people (4 times); incompetent leaders in the administration (3 times); and widespread poverty (3 times).

We should take note that the high frequency of political and economic instability indicate that these may actually be precipitating factors or the opportune moments to launch a military intervention and not necessarily underlying factors themselves.

Another observation is that of all the interventions, only the January 2001 EDSA II was launched for purely external causes.

In all, our country has so far experienced 9 major military interventions. Of these, seven failed and only two succeeded (EDSA I and II). All were incidentally launched with at least a similar motive of “national interest” at a time when there is political instability and/or economic uncertainty. It is also a fact that while all the failed military interventions were destructive to the country, the successful ones, though not really constructive either, were welcomed and accepted by the general public and the international community.

The successes of EDSA I and II are very significant. These defined the bounds within which military intervention is necessary, justified and acceptable as a means to replace an administration. Specifically, if an administration: (1) resorts to electoral fraud (as in the case of EDSA I); or (2) is perceived to be corrupt (as in the case of EDSA II).

Even then candidate for president Ramon Magsaysay planned for a coup should he be cheated by Pres Elpidio Quirino (de Quiros, 1990: 27) apparently justifying a military intervention should the integrity of the essence of democracy – the elections – be tampered with. De Quiros further wrote: “Equally importantly, Magsaysay’s contemplated coup in particular offered a theoretical pillar for ‘interventionist politics’: extra-constitutional methods were justifiable by the need to extirpate a corrupt government (de Quiros, 1990: 27).”

OTHER THEORIES ON THE CAUSE OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

1. Politicization of the AFP

Outside of those cited above as causes of military interventions, many theorize that the politicization of the AFP due to the expanded roles given during Martial Law is the root cause (Davide, 1990: 60; de Quiros, 1990: 48; Feliciano, 2003: 132; and Miranda, 1987: 1).

“But if this were so”, asked an Oakwood participant, “then why was it that only a small fraction of the military participated in interventions when the whole AFP had been exposed to the same politicization/socialization processes?” Moreover, all of those who participated in the Oakwood Incident grew up in their careers in an AFP that has reverted to its traditional roles and none had been part of the so-called “Martial Law AFP”. These arguments somehow make this theory passé.

Assuming that this theory were true, a “depoliticized” AFP may not necessarily be what is good for our society. For in the hands of a tyrannical president, this “obedient” AFP will also ensure a perpetual, oppressive rule. Should this be the case, a civilian uprising is most likely to happen.

A clear illustration of this scenario is the AFP during the Martial Law years. Contrary to the premise of this theory, the AFP during that time was not politicized even though it was given direct political power. It was precisely because of its professionalism, which in the definition of Prof. Carolina Hernandez is the ”respect for the chain of command” (Davide, 1990: 13), and the “pro-constitution” stand of the AFP then that Pres Marcos was able to perpetuate his rule. This blind loyalty to the chain of command made possible the execution of covert illegal operations (e.g. illegal arrests, coercions, tortures and summary executions) under the pretext of national security even if it was patent that these were against the interests of the people they were supposed to protect.

2. The Contagion Theory

According to Davide: “The ‘contagion’ theory states that a successful coup breeds other coups, either in the same government or in neighboring states. From the definition, it is obvious that the coup may occur either at the inter-governmental or the intra-military levels” (Davide, 1990: 19-20).

In a way, this theory partly explains why the soldiers who went to Oakwood Incident firmly believed that what they were doing was right. Apparently, they were comparing their actions to those made by Gen Reyes and company. But this is how far the theory goes since it cannot possibly be used in the formulation of alternatives because the successes of EDSA I and II are historical precedents, which we cannot change or erase. At the same time, we cannot be fatalistic and just fully submit to the theory’s proposition that a successful coup will breed other coups or military interventions.

ASSESSMENT/OUTCOME OF PAST AND PRESENT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

There were three significant policies implemented by the previous administrations to address military interventions: (1) The Davide Commission recommendations; (2) General Amnesty for the offenders; and (3) salary increase for AFP personnel. The present policies, on the other hand, are the recommendations put forth by the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission (FFFC).

THE DAVIDE COMMISSION

In the aftermath of the failed coup of December 1989, Pres Aquino issued Administrative Order No 146 creating a Presidential Commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 rebellion. Its members were Hilario G. Davide Jr, as Chairman; Carolina G. Hernandez, Ricardo J. Romulo, Delfin L. Lazaro, and Christian S. Monsod, as members (Davide, 1990: preface).

On January 3, 1990, Congress approved R.A. 6832 entitled: “An Act Creating a Commission To Conduct a Thorough Fact-finding Investigation of the Failed Coup D’Etat of December 1989, Recommend Measures To Prevent The Occurrence Of Similar Attempts At A Violent Seizure Of Power, And For Other Purposes.” It was signed into law by Pres Aquino on January 5, 1990, and took effect on January 12, 1990 (Davide 1990: preface).

After several months of research, collation of testimonies, discussions, and analyses, the Davide Commission, as it was eventually called, came up with its final report.
The following are its recommendations (Davide, 1990: 510-530):

A. “Damage Control” and Short-Term Prescriptions to Address the Immediate Problem of Preventing Another Coup Attempt

1) Administering a justice and rehabilitation program to military participants.

2) The strengthening of security measures on those under detention, especially where there may be sympathetic guards, i.e. Muntinlupa.

3) The intensification of efforts to capture key renegade soldiers with a special unit of trusted officers directly responsible to the CSAFP.

4) A reinvestigation of the “God Save The Queen” plot and prosecution of all those implicated in it.

5) A review of the subsequent actuations of those involved in the Manila Hotel Incident, both military and civilian, who pledged never to engage in similar adventurism again, if spared from prosecution.

6) An intensive follow-up investigation by government police agencies and the Justice Department of civilians implicated in the December 1989 attempt.

7) Speedy action on appeals over decisions of AFP courts martial.

8) The early passage of a comprehensive law on the establishment of the National Police.

9) The immediate implementation of a comprehensive program to provide timely rescue and medical assistance to troops wounded in combat.

10) A review by the military of its decision to disband the Scout Ranger Regiment.

11) An immediate audit of the value formation program of the military and, with the help of civilian experts, the formulation of an intensive program (essentially constructive indoctrination), and the training of field commanders to carry it out.

12) The immediate removal or reassignment of officers of less than 100% percent loyalty from sensitive positions in the military hierarchy, i.e. intelligence, operations, logistics, and training functions.

13) The immediate disbandment of GCFI and all other organizations not authorized by the military.

14) The observation of a systematic selection process for the new Chief of Staff that generates the least controversy about the choice.

15) Just as in the civilian government, a crackdown by the military on some “big fish” corrupt officers.

16) An immediate stop to unfair and/or humiliating treatment and criticism of military officers by Congress and other public officials, especially those before the Commission on Appointments.

17) Speedy and firm disciplinary action and/or prosecution against members of the military involved in human rights violations as well as of civilian law enforcement personnel involved in victimizing military personnel.

18) The purchase or charter by Congress of its own transportation facilities and a prohibition on their use of military equipment and aircraft.

19) The expansion of the government’s public information program, which has considerably and commendably improved since December 1989, with more participation by local government officials.

20) The provision of sufficient resources and support to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.

B. An Agenda for the Remaining Twenty-One Months of the Aquino Administration.

1) On the part of the Executive Department, a review of key policies and programs in the light of results, an acceptance of shortcomings where these exist, and a performance review of appointive officials.

2) On the part of the President, a categorical declaration of her position with respect to the issue of re-election.

3) On the part of the President, the immediate convening of the National Security Council and an initiative to invite all political parties to enter into a compact, to which people’s organizations and citizen groups would also subscribe, to defend and preserve our democracy, abjure the use of force and violence to effect change, commit to the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections in 1992, and arrive at solutions to our national problems through an honest and open debate of issues and programs.

4) On the part of the political opposition, a positive response to the call for a united front against unconstitutional means to change the government and for upholding democratic processes.

5) On the part of the Legislative Department and the President, the establishment of a special full-time commission to implement a post-insurgency program for the military that will modernize, professionalize, and bring it within the mainstream of national life.

6) On the part of the Legislative Department, the immediate enactment of laws to ensure the democratization of the electoral process and the validity and public acceptance of its results, with particular reference to the critical 1992 synchronized election.

7) The supremacy of civilian authority over the military should be established by the appointment, as soon as practicable, of civilians with the capability, integrity and leadership to head the Department of National Defense (DND), the National Security Council (NSC), and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). The NICA should have its own intelligence capability that can complement as well as validate military intelligence information.

8) The institutionalization of necessary improvements in the military in the areas of promotion and assignments, purchasing and auditing, educational benefits abroad, and compulsory attendance at military command schools.

9) The President and the Commission on Appointments must work out a system by which recommendations for promotions can be categorized in practice to avoid the exploitation of the confirmation process for political purposes.

10) If justice is going to be a living principle of governance, the budgets of the Judiciary and the Department of Justice (DOJ) must be increased in order to upgrade the physical facilities, recording, investigative and prosecutive capability, and staffing of the system.

11) The business sector, as the engine of growth of the economy, is the key sector, in addition to the government, in avoiding a severe economic crisis that could invite military adventurism. This is the time to stake its resources for democracy as the only political system under which it can survive and thrive, and thereby help others overcome their poverty.

12) The non-governmental and people’s organizations are intermediating institutions, which can help unify a factionalized society. By mobilizing communities and resources to improve the lives of the poor, they help the grassroots create a stake in democracy.

13) The church occupies a unique position in Philippine society, acting as an arbiter on moral issues even in the realm of politics, i.e. the condemnation of the election fraud by the Marcos administration in February 1986, although inhibited by the constitutional mandate of separation church and state, the boundaries of which may shift from time to time.

14) The resolution of the dilemma faced by the media in crisis reporting lies more in the media itself rather than government regulations.

C. Recommendations Over the Long-Term

1) Love of Country as the Highest Value.

2) Social Justice. The full implementation of the social justice provisions of the Constitution.

3) Citizen Army. The full implementation of the citizen army concept and the designated role of a small, modernized and professional military in a democratic society.

4) Decentralization. The decentralization of the national government as a precondition for the efficient delivery of government services.

5) The Constitution. After an appropriate period, to give the present Constitution an opportunity to be tested, formal consultations should be conducted at the grassroots on the desirability of constitutional amendments and of the specific proposals advanced by the different sectors. The people must be prepared to make amendments if it is clear that the fundamental law has proven to be irrelevant or inapplicable to the times.

6) Choosing Democracy. If a coup d’etat starts in the minds of men, then it is the collective will of a unified people that can prevent and overcome it. The people must choose democracy.

ASSESSMENT:

The Davide Commission, in its investigations, captured the true causes of past military interventions. It is also very comprehensive in its study of the origins of the AFP, and even the phenomenon of the coup d’ etat. Furthermore, the Commission was very detailed on its narrative of the previous military interventions.

Impressive as it is, the Davide Commission, however, was not clear in its methodology as to how it arrived at its 40 recommendations. As a result, when matched with the actual causes the Commission itself extracted from the 1989 coup participants, it came up with unresponsive recommendations. There were also some recommendations that were virtually impossible for any government agency to implement.

A possible explanation to this is that Chairman Davide and the other Commissioners, while they conducted an extensive research into the causes of past military interventions, already had their own biases as to how these interventions should be handled and it clearly reflected on their recommendations. The only alternative to this explanation is the fact that the Commissioners were not trained as policy analysts and thus, failed to identify more responsive recommendations.

OUTCOME:

The failure to come up with more responsive propositions to address the underlying causes of the problem is the main flaw of the Davide Commission. As a result, since 1990 or the year it came out with its final report, there had been two major military interventions, EDSA II and the Oakwood Incident. Hence, in terms of effectiveness in preventing military interventions, the Davide Commission recommendations failed.

GENERAL AMNESTY

McCoy wrote: “After his inauguration in July, President Ramos established the National Unification Commission (NUC) to negotiate the surrender of all rebel forces – Muslim, communist, and military” (McCoy, 1999: 303). By July 1993, Unification Commissioner Haydee Yorac recommended an absolute and unconditional amnesty to all military rebels (McCoy, 1999: 304). Finally on March 1994, Pres Ramos issued an amnesty for all rebels (McCoy, 1999: 314). This was subsequently approved by Congress on the following year.

ASSESSMENT/OUTCOME:

While this policy was not directly responsive in addressing any of the causes cited above, it may have released the air of hostility between the Ramos Administration and the RAM. In this regard, this policy succeeded since no military intervention occurred during the Ramos Administration. Although, it did not prevent the occurrence of EDSA II and the Oakwood Incident, almost all of those granted amnesty such as the members of the RAM and the Marcos loyalists never involved themselves again with the succeeding military interventions. Hence, in terms of pacifying or convincing the participants to return to mainstream society, it was a success. But, in terms of effectiveness to prevent interventions in the long term - this policy, however, was still a failure.

The possible reason for its failure in the long term is that a policy of amnesty will only promote peace with a specific generation of offenders but if the underlying causes of the offense are not addressed, then it is but a matter of time when a new generation will arise and pursue the same causes raised by those before them.

SALARY INCREASE OF AFP PERSONNEL

In the aftermath of the 1989 coup attempt, Davide wrote “in Congress, bills were rushed to grant pay increases to soldiers. Across-the-board salary increases for the whole AFP were unprecedentedly granted (106% for a Master Sergeant, to 36% for a General)” (Davide, 1990: 200). After that move, there had been three more pay increases to soldiers, of these; two were initiated by Pres Ramos, and one was initiated by Pres Estrada, which was signed into law last 2001 (R.A. # 9166). This was fully implemented in January 2004.

ASSESSMENT/OUTCOME:

According to the Oakwood participants, any significant salary increase will always be a boost on the morale of the AFP rank and file and will also send a clear message that the Administration is looking out for their well-being. Being so, it could definitely help dissuade soldiers from being recruited.

To illustrate, from the time Pres Aquino made the “unprecendented” salary increase up until before the Oakwood Incident, the issue about salary was never brought up by the AFP personnel. For this matter, the policy was responsive and had a semblance of success.

On the other hand, this policy failed to prevent EDSA II mainly because, as cited above, there were no internal causes raised at EDSA II; while, the Oakwood Incident occurred not because it failed as a policy but because the other causes could have weighed considerably more than the issue of salary.

Just the same, the salary problem was raised by the Oakwood participants because the soldiers did not significantly feel the latest increase. The reason being, R.A. # 9166 was implemented on a piecemeal basis spread over 3-years after the signing into law and therefore, negating whatever morale-boosting effect it had intended when it was crafted.

FELICIANO FACT-FINDING COMMISSION (FFFC)

1. Rationale

As a response to the Oakwood Incident, Pres Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo created the FFFC, through Administrative Order # 78 (Feliciano, 2003: Annex B), on 30 July 2003. According to the said AO, the FFFC was tasked to “evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the rebellion, its roots, and the provocations that inspired it, and submit its findings and recommendations to the President.”

In the furtherance of this mandate, the FFFC, in Rule 2, Section 1 of its own Resolution No. 001, defined their objectives as follows (Feliciano, 2003: Annex C):

A. To make a thorough investigation of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the failed rebellion or failed coup d’etat of 27 July 2003, its root causes and provocations, and

B. To recommend measures to prevent similar occurrences.

2. Assessment: On the findings of the FFFC as regards the true causes/provocations of the Oakwood incident

According to its findings, the following were the root causes/provocations of the Oakwood Incident (Feliciano, 2003: 132-135):

A. The politicization of the military amid the erosion of civilian political institutions that had oversight powers over the military, particularly during and since the imposition of martial law, is a cause of military adventurism. The AFP’s role as a partner in national development efforts led them to assume roles that used to be played by civilian authorities.

B. Failure on the part of the government to enforce the law deprives the law of its power to deter, particularly among those who had engaged in previous coup plots against the government but who were granted unconditional amnesty in 1995 without prior punishment.

C. The key role of the AFP in the campaigns against communist insurgency and Moro secessionism creates civilian government dependence upon the military. In addition to the clearing of areas of insurgents and defending such cleared areas, soldiers are required to discharge the tasks of consolidation and development that properly belong to civilian authorities. Not only is the military’s political power enhanced, but their politicization is also thereby increased as they confront the problems of these communities on a prolonged basis.

D. Enlistment by civilian persons, including politicians, of military support for their personal and political ambitions contributes to military politicization and adventurism. Former President Marcos (and not the AFP) initiated the enlargement of the role of the military during his incumbency, particularly during Martial Law. Civilian persons, including politicians, also sought and encouraged the military breakaway of February 1986 and January 2001, giving thereby the AFP great political leverage over the civilian leaders who appear to rely on the military for political survival. When adequately motivated, military adventurers could exploit this situation to destabilize and overthrow the government.

E. At the same time, officers and troops under diligent and respected commanding officers did not join in the 27 July mutiny, suggesting the critical role played by this breed of military leaders in dealing with the coup virus.

F. Grievances about graft and corruption in the military, such as the RSBS, the Modernization Fund, and the procurement system provide a fertile ground for the recruitment of officers and men for military intervention and even overthrow of government. The expression of grievances resonates to the wider polity who share these sentiments, even as they do not approve of the means used and the solution proffered by the Magdalo group.

G. The Commission believes that the discovery or disclosure of the plot led the rebels to prematurely to launch ‘Oplan Andres’, a plot larger than the Oakwood incident. Failure to attain the force requirements of Plans Alpha and Bravo compelled the rebels to launch Plan Charlie.

H. Moreover, members of PMA ’94 and ’95 were ‘frustrated’ when the dialogue about their concerns they expected would take place during the dinner hosted by the President on 23 July, did not take place. PMA ’94 and ’95 had the opportunity to talk to (Gen) Abaya at the ‘White House’. They talked about their class being unjustly linked to a plot against the government as well as about their commitment to fight graft and corruption ever since their graduation from the Academy. When the dinner with the President arranged for 23 July did not include a dialogue about their concerns, the invitees went down ‘frustrated’.

I. Finally, the order by the President aired on national television for the arrest of the coup leaders as ‘rogue soldiers’ was a precipitating factor behind the Oakwood Incident. At the time of the President’s order, the leaders of the plot were already missing from their respective units.

ASSESSMENT:

As we compare the root causes/provocations listed by the FFFC with those enumerated by the actual participants of the Oakwood Incident, we can see that only the complaint of graft and corruption in the AFP, matched. The only explanation to this is the fact that, according to the Oakwood participants, the FFFC never bothered to ask them as to what motivated them into going to Oakwood. Instead, the FFFC used the testimony of Ambassador Roy Cimatu to take note of some complaints raised during the negotiations. In addition, they also interviewed several dozens of officers who were not involved in Oakwood in the first place.

During its interviews with a few of the participants, what were asked by the FFFC were issues about “spontaneity” and the costs of the “armbands”. Even those complaints raised on national television and captured by the general public were perfunctorily brushed aside by the FFFC.

3. Assessment: On the FFFC recommendations

The following are the FFFC recommendations (Feliciano, 2003: 135-147):

A. Due diligence by commanding officers – Commanding officers in the field need constantly to warn their men against recruitment for destabilization plots against the government by adventurers in the military. Former military rebels who have turned their back on military adventurism could be used to conduct regular dialogues within the AFP for this purpose. The adoption of a program of this nature should go a long way towards neutralizing the coup virus.

B. Effectively address legitimate grievances – The government and the AFP need to address the legitimate grievances of the military against corrupt officers, officials, bureaucrats, and practices.

On the RSBS Problem

1) Liquidate the RSBS in an orderly manner.
2) Return the soldiers’ contributions.
3) Initiate an AFP Service and Insurance System.
4) Implement fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

On the AFP Procurement System: Conversion and Other Problems

1) Simplify the AFP procurement procedures.
2) Control commanders’ discretionary powers over the Centrally-Managed Funds.
3) Reduce the amount of CMF in GHQ/service HQ hands.
4) Strictly implement control measures over supplies.
5) Set tenure limits for AFP finance and procurement officers.
6) Establish an autonomous Internal Affairs Office (IAO).

On the AFP Modernization: Funding and Consequential Problems

1) Vigorously pursue recovery of the JUSMAG and NOVAI properties.
2) Pursue recovery of the “squatted” land in Fort Bonifacio.
3) Substantially increase AFP’s share in Fort Bonifacio’s sale proceeds.
4) Reinforce Office of the Ombudsman by increasing funding and other support.

On the State of the AFP Medical Services

1) Part of the funding of the AFP Modernization Program generated from the sale of Fort Bonifacio land should be dedicated to the modernization and upgrading of medical services, in accordance with the original statutory intent.
2) Consolidation of existing hospitals into fewer units could probably provide better medical services.
3) The suggestion that doctors be hired as doctors and compensated according to their level of expertise and experience and not according to rank, probably merits consideration and trial and validation.
4) A government counterpart to the premium paid by soldiers to PHILHEALTH insurance should enhance the benefits, which the military can receive.
5) Dedication of more efforts and funds to the improvement of the AFP medical services.

On the Problem of Benefits for Soldiers Killed in Action

1) Strengthening of the record system of the personal data of soldiers and their dependents.
2) Computerized information systems to provide accurate and updated data.

On the Inadequacies of AFP Housing for Officers and Enlisted Personnel

1) The AFP budget should provide for increased allocation of funds for the AFP On-Base Housing Program as well as its Off-Base Housing Program.
2) The “overstaying” of retired military personnel in AFP housing should be stopped and rectified.
3) The number of privately owned quarters in all military bases should be reduced, if not totally eliminated.
4) Strict implementation of existing criteria for the awarding of government quarters to officers and enlisted personnel in the active service must be ensured.

C. A civilian Secretary of National Defense – This Commission reiterates the recommendation of the Davide Commission to have a civilian appointed to the position of Secretary of National Defense (SND). Beyond the need to institutionalize civilian authority over the military, the appointment of persons who have not had long and deep ties to the military, and who have not held positions in the military establishment that itself needs to be reformed, is essential if a reform program is to succeed. Although military officers acquire a civilian status upon retirement, they are likely to bring the rigidity of hierarchy, seniority, camaraderie, and other aspects of the military culture into the office of the SND that would obstruct reform.

D. Return NICA to its original mandate – Likewise, echoing the Davide Commission recommendation, this Commission recommends the appointment of a civilian head for the NICA. Moreover, NICA should be returned to its original mandate, that is, to coordinate all intelligence agencies, military and otherwise. The President must have a source of intelligence additional to the ISAFP. This should provide the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) with a parallel intelligence source in the event that information gathered by the ISAFP is not made fully available to the C-in-C, for any reason whatsoever.

E. Enforce the law against all violators – Erring officers, troops and civilian partners in coup plots must be treated in accordance with law to control and reverse the culture of impunity. As already noted, former rebel soldiers that were punished for their participation in the coups of the 1980s tended to have abandoned military adventurism. To remedy the recurrence of ‘negotiation in mutual ignorance’ of applicable laws, this gap must be addressed in officer education and training.

F. Observe or respect the military’s political neutrality – Civilian political leaders must restrain themselves from enlisting military support for their personal and political agenda as this can only further politicize the military and grievously endanger the constitutional system. This is a theme that should constantly be recalled to politicians and political parties.

G. Provide ‘negotiators’ with clear terms of reference – Government ‘negotiators’ in similar incidents should be given clear terms of reference by the authorities to avoid misperceptions that could promote another coup plot in the future. In this regard, strict adherence to the law as recommended in (E) above need not deter rebel soldiers from ‘negotiating’ with government. In a ‘negotiation’ of a similar nature, it is incumbent on the government ‘negotiators’ to demonstrate to and persuade the other side that it is to their common interest to ‘negotiate’. The law itself embodies the basic principle that punishment must be tailored to the degree of participation in the offense to be penalized.

H. Create an office under the Office of the President to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission (Feliciano, 2003: 146)

ASSESSMENT:

Since the FFFC failed to extract the true causes of the incident as shown above, it is not expected to propose the right solutions. True enough, according to the Oakwood participants, most of the FFFC recommendations were unresponsive in addressing the causes raised in the Oakwood Incident.

Still, the FFFC came up with some detailed propositions (for the problems on RSBS, Procurement System, and the AFP housing) that seemed sensible and could be adopted. Also, the proposition to create an office under the Office of the President to oversee the implementation of policies could still be pursued.

It seems that both the Davide and the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commissions are reflective of the “research-based” executive policy making process in our country. Every time a serious crisis occurs, the knee-jerk reaction by the President is to form a fact-finding body to evaluate the facts; to determine the cause; to make necessary recommendations; and, if necessary, to form a narrative of events. Usually, the nucleus of this body is composed of lawyers or retired justices.

But the problem arises when the recommendations made by these fact-finding bodies are adopted automatically as national policies. This is not to undermine the competence of the members, but the recommendations made by fact-finding bodies are only meant to be starting points of further policy researches or definitive studies for the formulation of policy alternatives and should not be mistaken for the policy itself. These policy researches should only be conducted by qualified/trained policy analysts.

4. Probable Outcome

The failure to come up with more responsive propositions to address the underlying causes could be the main flaw of the present efforts to solve the problem. With this, it is expected that the problems will further deteriorate and in a matter of time, a new group may likely launch another military intervention to the detriment or the possible demise of the administration it will be launched against. In short, based on the assessment above, the FFFC recommendations will fail to prevent the recurrence of military interventions in the future.

DESCRIPTION OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES

Guided by the criterion of responsiveness; utilizing tools for identifying alternatives (e.g. literature review, development of typologies, passive collection and classification, etc.); and incorporating previous propositions assessed to be responsive or useful, the following alternatives were formulated:

ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESS THE INTERNAL CAUSES

1. Eradicate corruption in the AFP

Based on the data gathered, corruption in the AFP is the main cause of at least five military interventions; thus, its eradication is a must in any alternative that aims to prevent interventions in the future. More than the direct losses of the government in terms of resources, corruption breeds a culture that countervails the nobility of the military profession.

Eradicating corruption will greatly increase the level of professionalism in the AFP. Moreover, this will release the resources to where they are supposed to be spent (e.g. acquisition/upgrade of equipment, logistics support in field operations, intelligence collection, capital outlay, off-base/on-base housing, improvement of medical services, etc.).

The problem of corruption in the AFP is very complicated. It comes in various forms and occurs in all areas of operations and all levels of the organization (Trillanes, 2001: 15). For this reason, it is difficult to prescribe a panacea for its eradication. Hence, it merits a separate policy research in itself.

2. Rehabilitate the Retirement Separation Benefit System (RSBS)

The bankruptcy of the RSBS is also a major source of morale problems in the rank and file of the AFP. A retiring soldier deserves nothing less than a peaceful and comfortable life after devoting three decades to the service of his country, often at the expense of a normal family life. To be deprived or delayed of the receipt of retirement benefits due him is simply unforgivable to the ordinary soldier.

Like corruption however, the problem of the RSBS is complicated. Hence, a separate policy research is required to flesh out the problem and provide the appropriate solutions. The propositions made by the FFFC as regards the RSBS problem could be adopted for this purpose.

3. Strictly apply meritocracy in the AFP promotions system

Two of the major causes of military interventions are the predominance of inept officers in the AFP leadership, and the prevailing political patronage in the AFP promotions system. One way to extirpate these is the strict application of meritocracy.

It works this way: the foremost trait in the military organization is leadership. According to what is being inculcated to cadets in the Philippine Military Academy, “Leadership is the art of influencing men in order to accomplish the mission.” From this definition, we can deduce that leadership is a skill, which sadly, not all of those in the AFP possess.

In the AFP however, there is a way to determine who has the necessary leadership qualities for higher command, this is called “service reputation”. It is incorporated in the AFP promotions system and is based on the subject officer’s reputation reflected by his unit/ individual performances as well as previous work relations with superiors, peers, and subordinates.

Next to seniority, it should precede the other criteria in the system such as: geographical assignments, awards, schooling, billet assignments, etc. In other words, through seniority, we can determine who are the candidates for promotion whereas through “service reputation” and the other criteria, we can determine who among these candidates deserve to be promoted or not.

The problem arises when a “patron” meddles with the system and pushes for the promotion of a protégé, a relative or a friend, ahead of those who deserve it. In time, this practice bred a culture of political patronage where the officers who know how the system works, consciously seek patrons to ensure their promotion. Eventually, it politicized the whole system or what is referred to in the AFP as “militics”.

This affects the morale of the rank and file, as the good officers get by-passed by the inept ones who have “connections”. This also results in the loss of respect for the undeserving senior officers. In due course, most of the important positions in the AFP are filled up with this kind of inept/politically indebted officers.

4. Uplift the standard of living of the AFP personnel

If the morale were high among the men not only will it be difficult for anyone to recruit them for any military intervention, it will also increase their enthusiasm in going about their work.

Although morale cannot be quantified, to the lowly soldier it simply translates to: rest and recreation (R & R) to spend time with the family; and money to spend for the family. The common denominator in both is the family. R & R is not much of a problem since this can be given periodically by the unit commander. But often this is not being availed of by the soldiers since even the transportation expenses to go home, is also a problem. So, if the government can only provide the additional benefits to the soldiers for their families, as enumerated below, then the morale of the soldier will be greatly boosted.

It is conceded that there would be financial constraints in the implementation of these particular propositions but after stressing enough the extreme importance of the success of the overall policy, these propositions should be financially supported.

A. Salary increase or giving of non-monetary benefits

The issue of salary figured as one of the major internal causes in some of the past military interventions; therefore, raising the salary of AFP personnel will be directly addressing this cause. Although apparently, this was not one of their driving motivations; still, the salaries given to the officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP are clearly not commensurate to the service they are giving to their country and this, definitely, affects their morale.

An alternative to a salary increase is giving of additional non-monetary benefits such as: tax reductions/exemptions, reduction of RSBS contributions, rice subsidy, C-130 flights or ship passes for soldiers going on R & R, etc.

B. Improvement of medical and health services

It is acknowledged that the general state of medical and health services in the country is pathetic. But for a soldier to escape death in the battlefield but die inside a military hospital because of lack of supplies, equipment or worse, because of incompetence – is truly a catastrophe that spreads quickly within the ranks.

A marked improvement in the medical and health services will greatly impress upon the soldiers that the administration is concerned for their well-being and this will be gladly reciprocated through a more enthusiastic, selfless service to the country.

C. Mass housing

It is a known fact that most of the AFP personnel are homeless. Some are even squatting in areas near bases where they are assigned. So, providing every soldier his own home will definitely be a big morale-booster.

There are huge tracts of land located in military reservations across the country that can easily address this problem. In addition, the FFFC recommendations as regards AFP housing could still be pursued.

5. Streamline the AFP bureaucracy

Most of the meager budget of the AFP is used up by the maintenance costs of having a bloated bureaucracy. This hinders the flow of funds to the front lines or operating units where they are needed. As a result, soldiers assigned to the field units who experience difficulties in actual combat operations due to shortages in logistics get demoralized when they get to visit the administrative offices where resources are lavishly spent or given out.

This problem was exacerbated by the recent signing of R.A. 9188, increasing the number of generals in the AFP. This meant additional administrative offices and therefore, additional demands for resources.

The following are some of the proposed activities of the streamlining:

A. Consolidation of offices/units with redundant/overlapping functions.

B. Dissolution of resource-heavy but unproductive offices/units.

C. Reduction of generals in the AFP Table of Organization.

D. Dissolution of the General Headquarters (GHQ) and the adoption of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept.

The realization of the above is expected to free up the necessary resources that is being consumed by the top-heavy AFP bureaucracy. These resources in turn, can now be channeled to the operational units where they are most needed and also to fund morale and welfare programs as cited in number 4 above.

6. Create a cabinet-level agency (e.g. The Presidential Adviser on Military Affairs) directly under the Office of the President.

An office with a direct access to the President, similar to what was recommended by the FFFC will ensure the proper implementation of the proposed reforms. It should have oversight powers and clear inter-department relationships with all concerned to prevent over-lapping of functions. This office will also conduct the appropriate policy researches to further flesh out the more complicated problems enumerated and other internal causes not raised by this paper.

ALTERNATIVE TO ADDRESS THE EXTERNAL CAUSES

Practice good governance.

Good governance, according to Kinuthia-Njenga, is “perceived as a common good that cuts across many segments of the development scene” (Kinuthia-Njenga, 1999). The World Bank defines it as the “manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (Kinuthia-Njenga, 1999). According to the UNDP: “Its dimensions are the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, participation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision” (UNDP, 1999).

Furthermore, good governance ensures that all policies or decisions emanating from an incumbent administration will be for the best interest of the country or the majority of the people.

With these definitions of good governance, all the major external causes namely: corruption, failure to deliver basic services, state-sponsored terrorism, poverty, and political and economic instability; are covered. Hence, only the practice of good governance will effectively address them.

Indeed, according to an AdMU paper: “The quality of civilian governance is the variable essential to its survival and sustainability. There is simply no substitute for good, effective and responsive political and economic performance” (AdMU, 2001). Likewise, according to Dr. Wilfredo Villacorta, “the best way to prevent the recurrence of a coup is to institute fundamental reforms that will bring justice and progress in society” (Villacorta, 1989: 54).

POLITICAL FEASIBILITY:

For good governance to be tested for political feasibility is paradoxical. Ideally, it should be politically feasible for it is the essence of government itself – to serve the people and to serve them well. However, given the state of political affairs and the bureaucracy in our country today, good governance had been reduced to nothing but a political slogan.

First to resist this is the oligarchic elite, who will defy anything that will threaten its hold over the country’s riches. Next, are the politicians who, like the oligarchy, are deeply entrenched in the status quo where they enjoy vast powers and resources at the expense of the people who voted for them. Another sector that would resist good governance is the corruption-ridden bureaucracy.

The only answer to this collective resistance is for the President to have moral integrity and political will. Moral integrity is the guarantee that there will always be “purity of intent” in every policy made. While, political will is the assurance that such a policy will be implemented. Armed with these two, good governance can be done.

Then again, any President, who will say that the practice of good governance is not politically feasible, does not deserve to rule this country.

CONCLUSION and POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Military interventions greatly affect our country’s economic and political stability, and international image. More than this, lives are often caught in the crossfire. Simply put, we cannot afford another one.

Military interventions are set off by underlying causes within the organization, government and society in general; hence, the only way to prevent its occurrence is to address these underlying causes. But based on the assessment made above, most of the present policies, as stated through the Feliciano Fact-Finding Commission recommendations, are not responsive to the underlying causes of the Oakwood Incident and therefore, implementing the FFFC recommendations alone will not prevent future military interventions.

On the other hand, other possible alternatives enumerated above directly addressed the underlying causes and therefore, may have better chances of success. But crucial to their proper implementation is the demand for an unbending political will and moral integrity from no less than the President.

In view of this conclusion, the following are hereby recommended:

1. Pursue the implementation of the following FFFC recommendations, which were found to be responsive or useful:

A. Creation of a cabinet-level agency (e.g. The Presidential Adviser on Military Affairs) directly under the Office of the President. It should have oversight powers and clear inter-department relationships with all concerned to prevent over-lapping of functions. This office will also conduct the appropriate policy researches to further flesh out the more complicated problems enumerated below as well as other internal causes not raised by this paper.

B. The propositions regarding the RSBS, Procurement System, AFP Modernization, AFP Medical Services, and AFP Housing.

2. Review the other FFFC recommendations as to their responsiveness to the causes of military interventions.

3. Conduct policy researches on the following:

A. Eradication of corruption in the AFP.
B. Rehabilitation of RSBS.
C. Strict application of meritocracy in the AFP promotions system.
D. Uplifting of the standard of living of the AFP personnel through:

1) Salary increase or non-monetary benefits such as, tax reductions/exemptions, reduction of RSBS contributions, rice subsidy, C-130 flights or ship passes for soldiers going on R & R, etc.
2) Improvement of medical and health services.
3) Mass housing.

E. Streamlining of the AFP bureaucracy.

4. Practice good governance to address the external causes of military intervention.

These propositions, extensive as they may seem, do not preclude any military intervention that may occur later on due to reasons outside of those analyzed for example, one that is motivated by religious fanaticism. While this or any other reason may be unlikely at the moment, it should be noted nonetheless.

Finally, the responsibility for the success or failure of the overall policy to prevent military interventions rests solely on the President. As emphasized, the consequences of failure are severe. For this reason alone, it is incumbent upon him to ensure that nothing hinders its implementation. But more than this, I would like to believe that the President who would implement this policy is not doing it out of the fear of a military intervention but for the honest desire to serve the Filipino people.

REFERENCE

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1990 The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832). Makati: Bookmark Inc., October 1990

de Quiros, Conrado
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Feliciano, Florentino P. et. al.
2003 THE REPORT OF THE FACT FINDING COMMISSION. October 17, 2003

Guingona, Teofisto
1989 As quoted in “Reflections on the December 1989 Coup D’ Etat”. Manila: Senate, 1989.

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2003 “The Greenbase Expose”. Quezon City: UP, October 2003.

____________________.
2001 “A Study of Corruption in the Philippine Navy”. Quezon City: UP, October 2001.

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2001 “Understanding Military Intervention in Politics”. Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University. 2001. downloaded from www.focusweb.org

2003 Republic Act no. 9188 “An Act Strengthening the Professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines by Increasing the Percentage Distribution of Generals/Flag Officers in the AFP Table of Organization, Amending for this Purpose Republic Act Numbered Eighty-One Eighty-Six (R.A. 8186) and for Other Purposes”. Metro Manila: Congress of the Philippines, February 10, 2003.

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The GREENBASE expose

2006-12-03T05:20:00.000-08:00

LTSG ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV PN
October 2003

“The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.”

- 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines

THE OAKWOOD INCIDENT

On the early morning of July 27, 2003, a group of soldiers occupied the Oakwood Hotel in Makati to conduct protest actions against the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Administration. Among the grievances they voiced out was GMA’s alleged responsibility for the Davao bombing incidents.

In the investigations that followed, the soldiers admitted that the ultimate sources of their information are the so-called Greenbase Documents. How true are these documents? What exactly is OPLAN GREENBASE all about? Indeed, what did these documents contain that were serious enough to drive these soldiers to rise against their very own Commander-in-Chief? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions never came as the investigations focused more on the peripheral issues such as armbands and on whether the soldiers’ actions were spontaneous or not. Eventually, the Greenbase issue was buried and forgotten.
Until now…

GMA’s PEACE POLICY

Upon assumption to power, GMA adopted an all-out peace policy for all the different rebel and secessionist groups. This was articulated in her own Executive Order #3 signed on 28 Feb 2001 entitled “Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for Government’s Comprehensive Peace Efforts” (see Annex A) where a comprehensive peace process provided a holistic framework in addressing the long-running insurgency and secessionism in the country.

Likewise, in her Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 2001-2004, she stressed that the vision for sustained peace and development in Mindanao is the peaceful coexistence of all stakeholders. “It outlined the challenges to be addressed such as: preventing the recurrence of armed conflict; addressing cultural inequity as manifested in the loss of ancestral lands and non-consideration of cultural aspects in programs and projects, and in addressing political inequity through the full implementation of autonomy, increased representation in government of Muslims and lumads, and improved conflict resolution and negotiation mechanisms.” (Relief, Rehab efforts intensified in Mindanao, Manila Times, 19 June 01).

As regards peace efforts with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), confidence-building measures complemented these peace policy declarations. On 20 Feb 2001, GMA announced the suspension of offensive military operations (SOMO) with the MILF. A few days later, then Justice Secretary Perez said that the multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder charges against the MILF leaders would be returned to the DOJ for reinvestigation. (Raps vs MILF leaders dropped. Inquirer News Service. 24 Feb 01). Then on March 16, NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco announced that the Rizal Day bombing was not the handiwork of the MILF. (Rizal Day attacks, NBI clears MILF on bombings. PDI. 17 Mar 01).

On 24 March 2001, the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks is signed by the GRP and MILF panels in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (State of the Nation Address (SONA) 2003 Technical Report). This paved the way for the MILF’s suspension of all offensive military action in their areas of operation on 03 April 2001.

The first round of formal Peace Talks were held in Tripoli, Libya on 22 June 2001 where both panels signed the Agreement on Peace between the GRP and the MILF. The second round was held on 07 August 2001 that resulted to the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF. Then on 18 October 2001, the third round of Peace Talks was held in Kuala Lumpur where both panels signed the Manual of Instruction for the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities and the local Monitoring Teams. (SONA 2003 Technical Report).

In the ensuing months, while there were still some minor clashes between the AFP and the MILF, the peace talks seemed to be holding. Which led GMA to say that “the sincerity of the MILF top command to join the mainstream and let their people share whatever development there can be is really very, very clear.” (Presidential News Desk News Release No. 7, 27 Feb 02). For a while it seemed that the ever-elusive peace in Mindanao is finally at hand.

But in early February 2003, AFP operations were stepped up in Central Mindanao incurring heavy losses on the side of the MILF. The AFP said that the reason for the attack was to dismantle two new MILF camps. (Abaya: MILF suffers heavy casualties in Mindanao operations. Froilan Gallardo. inq7.net. 05 Feb 03). Then on Feb 11, the Army’s 6th Infantry (K) Division launched a full-scale attack on the Buliok Complex in the Liguasan Marsh Area in Pikit, North Cotabato. (The Fall of Buliok Complex – 6ID. 03 Mar 03. Downloaded from http://www.army.mil.ph/). Suddenly, the government is again at war with the MILF.

BULIOK OFFENSIVE’S RATIONALE

In justifying the renewed attacks, Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas Ople said “the AFP units entered this area by the Liguasan Marsh for only one purpose: to apprehend the criminal elements of the notorious Pentagon Gang that had fled to the Buliok Complex, seeking sanctuary in the MILF camps.” (Statement of Sec. Blas Ople in a briefing for OIC Ambassador, DFA. 19 Feb 03). Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes meanwhile said that the AFP was “in hot pursuit of certain lawless elements, principally the kidnap-for-ransom groups and people responsible in the bombing last December 24.” (Tension up in North Cotabato ahead of troops-MILF clash. Froilan Gallardo. inq7.net. 10 Feb 03).

Could these be the real reasons for launching a full-scale war with the 10,000-strong MILF and negating all the milestone achievements in the peace talks? Just so that a band of 100 kidnappers could be apprehended? Or, the hot pursuit of lawless elements who committed a crime more than a month before?

But then again, Sec. Reyes himself acknowledged before the Congressional Oversight Committee on the VFA, which was studying the feasibility of holding RP-US war games in Sulu, that “he was uncertain if those killed during the Buliok operations were Pentagon Gang members or Muslim guerrillas.” Asked further if the mission was accomplished? All Sec. Reyes could answer were “I don’t know” or “I cannot recall” responses, which disappointed Senators Biazon, Pimentel and Angara. Sen. Biazon even commented, “I think the Defense Secretary is trying to evade responsibility for the Mindanao problem.” (Reyes comes under fire for ordering the Buliok offensive. Joshua Dancel. Manila Times. 12 Mar 03)

Now, if the official reason for the Buliok operations given by the government is not true, then what is? What could have motivated GMA to turn her back on her own peace initiatives and plunge her country and people into a war that would eventually kill hundreds of people, injuring thousands more and displacing at least 300,000 civilians?

THE GREENBASE DOCUMENTS

The Greenbase Documents are actually photocopies of what appeared to be two official Malacañang documents. The first is a Memorandum of Instructions dated 11 Feb 2003 addressed to then Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes and purportedly signed by GMA. (see Annex B).

The second is purportedly signed by then Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Eduardo Ermita and is entitled “The President’s Four-Point Policy Framework in Addressing the Southern Philippine Secessionists/MILF Problem (Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Instructions approved on 11 Feb 2003) (see Annex C). Both documents were leaked sometime in February 2003 right after the start of the Buliok Complex offensive.

The Memorandum of Instruction (MOI) authorized the implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE, which is basically an action plan to capture and occupy the Buliok Complex fronting the Liguasan Marsh Area. The reason for the clearing operations is to enable the NEDA to implement the 25-year Liguasan Marsh Development Framework Plan and the revival of the Farm-In Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement between Philippine National Oil Company-Exploration Corporation and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd.

Another objective of the plan according to the MOI is to capture MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim dead or alive. Also, the MOI explicitly stated that all matters pertinent to OPLAN GREENBASE should be coordinated with the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns.

The Four-Point Policy Framework (FPPF) meanwhile, detailed and expanded OPLAN GREENBASE into an action plan that would operationalize the approved MOI of GMA. The action plan is broken down into a four-point policy framework.

The first point provided the guidelines for the capture and occupation of the Buliok Complex and the capture of MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim.

The second point explicitly stated that the Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities has been suspended indefinitely. Moreover, the government will set up a monitoring team to absorb the duties and functions of the yet to be formed, OIC monitoring team.

The third point is about the government’s intention to invoke its right for the MILF to observe the May 6 joint communiqué where the MILF agreed to interdict criminal elements taking refuge in these controlled areas. It also states that once the Liguasan Marsh is cleared of the MILF, the Liguasan Marsh Development Plan, the Farm-In Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement between PNOC-EC and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and the Manila-Tripoli-Kuala Lumpur palm oil project could be implemented.

The fourth point, however, is the most controversial part of the whole document. In its entirety it states:

“The MILF must be held responsible for the AFP-backed spate of bombing in urban areas and destruction of several Napocor transmission towers, power sub-stations and barges, the Mt. Apo Geothermal Power Plant, the Pulangi Power Plant, and power plants of electric cooperatives and companies in Mindanao. Appropriate charges of rebellion, sedition, multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder will be filed against MILF leaders in various courts in order to secure warrants of arrest against them and reduce them in estoppel.

“The AFP’s plan to conduct comprehensive psywar operations over print and broadcast media, and destabilizations in urban Christian areas, such as Davao International Airport, Awang Airport, Gen Santos City International Standard Airport, Zamboanga International Airport, Cagayan de Oro Airport, principal ports and wharves, foreign embassies and consulates, hotels and restaurants, shopping malls, hospitals, churches, public markets and terminals, radio and television stations, factories, oil depots and gasoline stations, buses, cinemas, schools, plazas and others must be intensified and thereafter put the blame on the MILF so as to convince the Asean, the European Union, and the United States’ State Department to formally declare the MILF as a FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION and Chairman Hashim Salamat as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist because of the gravity and magnitude of threat he and the MILF pose on the national security and territorial integrity of the Philippines and Asean Countries. Hashim’s capture or death, and MILF’s designation as an FTO will ensure the smooth conduct of Balikatan 03-1 in Central Mindanao and the US troops’ planned basing in Sarangani-Gen. Santos City.”

PROPAGANDA or ACTION PLAN?

The assertions of the GMA Administration against the Greenbase documents were articulated by Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio Bunye when he said in a press briefing on 27 Feb 2003, “We’d like to state that this document is spurious. It is not true. This document is fake and it has been circulated probably to agitate the Muslim population in Mindanao.” (Downloaded from http://www.op.gov.ph/). On the other hand, the claim of the protesting soldiers in Oakwood was that the OPLAN GREENDBASE contained in the documents was an action plan authorized by GMA herself and executed by different government agencies.

Since a spurious or propaganda material is supposed to contain false information while an action plan is based on true information, instructions or guidelines for action that will be acted upon, then to authenticate the documents, or more specifically the contents thereof, they would have to be subjected to a single evaluation criterion, FACTS. These facts may come in the form of official pronouncements by government officials or by GMA herself or actual events that occurred that would validate or invalidate specific statements contained in the Greenbase Documents.

The following are the findings:

Memorandum of Instructions (MOI)

1. MOI - In para 2 it states that “the AFP must CAPTURE AND OCCUPY simultaneously within one week the Buliok Complex fronting the Liguasan Marsh Area…”
Findings - On Feb 12, GMA declared: “I order the AFP to capture and occupy the Buliok Complex fronting the Liguasan Marsh Area…” (PND News Release. 12 Feb 03). This statement is not only very similar to what was written in the MOI but it also coincides with the date written on the document, which is February 11, 2003.

- On Feb 11, the Philippine Army’s 6th Infantry (K) Division launched an offensive in the Liguasan Marsh Area, particularly the Buliok Complex (The Fall of Buliok Complex – 6ID. Downloaded from http://www.army.mil.ph/, 03 Mar 03).

2. MOI - In para 1 it states, “I order that the OPLAN GREENBASE must be totally implemented without prejudice to the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace.”

Finding - The GRP-MILF Agreement of Peace was signed by both peace panels on 22 June 2001 in Tripoli, Libya. (SONA 2003 Technical Report)

3. MOI - In para 2 it states, “the GRP-MILF Agreements on the General Cessation of Hostilities is hereby suspended indefinitely.”

Finding - The GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities was signed on 18 July 1997 with the Manual of Instructions signed on 18 October 2001. (SONA 2003 Technical Report). This was unilaterally suspended when the AFP launched a full-scale attack on the Buliok Complex.

4. MOI - In para 2 it states, “the Buliok Complex has been identified by the Southcom as the base of operations and refuge area of the notorious Pentagon kidnap-for-ransom group and other heavily armed criminal groups in Mindanao.”

Finding - On Feb 12, GMA said: “The Buliok Complex has been identified as the base of operations and refuge area of the notorious Pentagon kidnapping gang and other heavily armed criminal groups in Mindanao.” (PND News Release, 12 Feb 03). This statement is almost identical to what is stated in the MOI.

5. MOI - In para 2 it states, “…Buliok Complex where Salamat Hashim’s headquarters ‘Islamic Center’ is located.”

Finding - The Islamic Center Mansion of Salamat Hashim is located inside Buliok Complex, which was seized by government troops on 16 Feb 2003. (Gov’t troops take over “Mansion” of TOP MILF leader. PDI. 17 Feb 03)

6. MOI - In para 3 it states, “I have instructed the Department of Energy Secretary to revive the Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract (Cotabato Basin Exploration Project) between Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and the Philippine National Oil Company-Exploration Corporation as the draft Farm-In Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement between the PNOC and Petronas are ready for signing.”

Finding - According to PNOC-EC records, the PNOC-EC and the Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCOSB) entered into a joint agreement to explore the 1,044,000-hectare Cotabato Basin on 29 April 1995. The contract was pursuant to the Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract and the pre-negotiated service contract dated 10 May 1994 between the Department of Energy and PNOC-EC. However, in 1997, this contract was pre-terminated by PCOSB for security reasons since 5 PCOSB project team members were kidnapped.

7. MOI - In para 4 it states, “I have further ordered the NEDA Director-General to implement the much delayed 25-year Liguasan Marsh Development Framework Plan…”

Finding - There is a NEDA project entitled “LIGUASAN MARSH DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN 1999-2025.” As of the present, the project implementation is delayed by 4 years.

8. MOI - In para 5 it states, “serve the warrants of arrest issued against Samier Hashim, Ustaz Salamat Hashim, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and Eid Kabalu by various courts two years ago.”

Finding - There were warrants of arrest for top MILF leaders for the charges of multiple murder, frustrated multiple murder and these were given back to the DOJ two years ago for reinvestigation. (Raps vs. MILF leaders dropped. Inquirer News Service, 24 Feb 01)

9. MOI - In para 6 it states, “In implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), and the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) must ensure that all evacuees in the war-affected barangays of Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat provinces are orderly evacuated…”

Findings - On Feb 19, GMA, in a luncheon meeting with members of the Malacañang Press Corps, said: “I order Social Welfare and Development Secretary Corazon Juliano-Soliman and National Anti-Poverty Commission Secretary Teresita Deles to visit the area and make sure that the needs of the residents of the area, especially the evacuees, are met.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

- The NDCC gave P5 million to Cotabato Governor Emmanuel Piñol to fund a development plan for displaced families. (GMA asks Pikit Folk: have faith in gov’t. 02 Jul 03. Downloaded from www.pia.gov.ph)

10. MOI - In para 7 it states, “It is desired that all matters pertinent hereto shall be fully coordinated with the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns.”

Findings - On Feb 19, in the State Dining Room in Malacañang, GMA said: “I’ve appointed my Secretary for the Peace Process, Secretary Ed Ermita, to be my action officer for my Administration’s comprehensive peace and development efforts in the Liguasan Marsh Area.” (Downloaded from www.ops.gov.ph)

- On Feb 19, GMA, in a luncheon meeting with members of the Malacañang Press Corps said: “I also sent Presidential Adviser on Special Concerns Norberto Gonzales to initiate talks regarding the peace process with MILF peace panel in Kuala Lumpur.” (Downloaded from http://www.op.gov.ph/)

The Four-Point Policy Framework (FPPF)

1. FPPF - In para 1 it states, “the AFP must capture and occupy Buliok Complex and environs within a week of continuous, massive aerial and infantry attacks…”

Finding - On Feb 28, GMA, in an interview with Malacañang reporters in Camp General Mateo Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal, said: “I strongly believe in the capability of the military to follow deadlines that I have been giving them. When I told them to capture Buliok Complex in three days, the Armed Forces completed their mission before my deadline.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

- The AFP captured the whole Buliok Complex on 15 Feb 03. (Pikit fighting subsides: Military captures MILF stronghold in Cotabato. Inquirer News Service. 10 Feb 03)
2. FPPF - In para 1 it states, “The government’s high-value target in the implementation of OPLAN Greenbase is to CAPTURE MILF HASHIM SALAMAT DEAD OR ALIVE.”

Finding - On August 5, MILF Chairman Hashim Salamat was pronounced dead* by MILF Spokesperson Eid Kabalu. He said that Salamat died of cardiac arrest last 13 July 2003. (OFFICIAL: DEATH of MILF chair won’t stall peace talks. PDI. 06 Aug 03)

* It was not explained by Eid Kabalu why the MILF delayed the announcement of Chairman Salamat’s death. Maybe they were only forced to announce his death since the peace talks were about to resume and they had earlier announced that Chairman Salamat was willing to act as Chief Negotiator. Whether he actually died during the Buliok operations but was kept secret at that time to avoid a breakdown in the MILF command structure as well as the morale of their fighters, or he truly died of cardiac arrest as officially pronounced, would never be known.

3. FPPF - In para 1 it states “With the capture of all MILF camps, the Government, with the active participation of the Local government units in the area, must establish an Area of Temporary Stay (ATS) where the MILF rebels and their surviving leaders can be concentrated to avoid “mis-encounters” while negotiations for their total capitulation are going on.”

Finding - One of the talking points during the March 01 meeting of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COCIS) was to “establish an Area of Temporary Stay (ATS) for MILF rebels to avoid ‘mis-encounters’ while negotiations are going on.” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt plan for peace with MILF. Donna Pazzibugan. Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar 03)

4. FPPF - In para 2 it states, “the Government will set up an acceptable monitoring team composed of PNP and AFP officials to monitor effectively any ceasefire mechanism that could be devised by the Defense Department.”

Finding - One of the talking points during the March 01 meeting of the COCIS was “setting up an acceptable monitoring team to monitor ceasefire mechanism on the ground.” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt plan for peace with MILF. Donna Pazzibugan. Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar 03)

5. FPPF - In para 3 it states, “The Government invokes its right for the MILF to fully observe the May 6, 2002 joint communiqué where the MILF agreed to interdict criminal elements taking refuge in their remaining controlled areas…”

Finding - One of the talking points during the March 01 meeting of the COCIS was “for both sides to observe their May 6, 2002 joint communiqué where the MILF agreed to interdict criminal elements taking refuge in their controlled areas.” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt plan for peace with MILF. Donna Pazzibugan. Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar 03)

6. FPPF - In para 3 it states, “the LGU’s of Cotabato province and Pikit can now start implementing the Special Economic Enhancement and Development Program for Pikit (Seed Pikit).”

Finding - On Feb 26, GMA, in a NAPC meeting in Malacañang, said: “North Cotabato Governor Emmanuel Piñol has already drawn a development program for Pikit. I already released P5 million from the National Government to assist in the development plan.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

7. FPPF - In para 3 it states, “the Government through the National Development Co. will be in a better position to fully implement the US $100 million joint venture Manila-Tripoli-Kuala Lumpur palm oil and sugarcane plantations confidential deal being hammered out by the President as a promissory concession once the two countries agreed to meddle in a peace talk with the MILF.”

Findings - On Feb 19, GMA, in a luncheon meeting with members of the Malacañang Press Corps said: “The establishment of a palm oil plantation in Buliok is in order, to be bankrolled by the Khaddafi Foundation. They have been looking for a consolidated area. The foundation’s local partner is the National Development Corporation. Very soon, an investment decision might be concluded.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

- The Buliok offensive was implemented to prepare the Liguasan Marsh for the Libyan Palm Oil Plantation Project. GMA allegedly had a personal interest in the $100-million worth project. It was proposed to her by Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns Norberto Gonzales in 2001 upon her assumption to power. The joint Libyan-Malaysian deal involved the Al Ghaddafi Foundation headed by the Libyan leader’s son, Sayf Al Islam. (GMA under fire for Libya Palm Oil Deal. Philippine Headline News Online. 05 March 03)

- On Feb 26, GMA, in a NAPC meeting in Malacañang said: “Part of the development fund will be used for planting corn and part of it will be for planting palm oil. Malaysia, after my talks with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in my last visit to Kuala Lumpur, will be providing the planting materials for palm oil.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

- On March 28, both GRP and MILF peace panels agreed to involve Libya in the Peace Talks. (Gov’t, MILF agree to resume peace talks. PDI. 31 Mar 03)

- On March 26, GMA said: “I am confident that Malaysia’s support as third party facilitator in the peace talks between the Philippine Government and the MILF will succeed.” (PND News Release, 26 Mar 03)

8. FPPF - In para 4 it states, “the MILF must be held responsible for the AFP-backed spate of bombings in urban areas and destruction of several Napocor transmission towers, power sub-stations and barges…”

Findings - One of the talking points during the March 01 meeting of the COCIS was “pinpointing responsibility for the spate of bombings in urban areas and destruction of several Napocor transmission towers…” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt plan for peace with MILF. Donna Pazzibugan. Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar 03)

- On Feb 15, two Napocor transmission towers in Carmen and Pikit towns were bombed. The MILF was blamed by the AFP for the incident but MILF spokesperson Eid Kabalu denied MILF involvement. (2 more Napocor transmission towers bombed. Froilan Gallardo. Mindanews. 15 Feb 03)

- On Feb 26, seven Napocor transmission towers were bombed. (Power outages loom after Mindanao blackout. sunstar.com. 28 Feb 03)

- On Feb 27, AFP Southern Command Spokesman Lt. Col Daniel Lucero said: “The MILF has earlier threatened to attack power stations and steel towers, and we are blaming them for these attacks.” (MILF sabotage blamed for Mindanao blackout. Edith Regalado, Roel Pareño, et.al. Philippine Star. 28 Feb 03.). But Eid Kabalu denied involvement of the MILF in those bombings. (Power outages loom after Mindanao blackout. sunstar.com. 28 Feb 03)

9. FPPF - In para 4 it states, “Appropriate charges of rebellion, sedition, multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder will be filed against MILF leaders in various courts in order to secure warrants of arrest against them and reduce them in estoppel.”

Finding - On March 07, multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder charges were filed against MILF leaders Salamat Hashim, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, Ghazali Jaafar and Eid Kabalu in connection with the Davao Airport bombings. (Gov’t files bombing charges vs MILF head, 148 others. Inquirer News Service. 07 Mar 03)

10. FPPF - In para 4 it states, “The AFP’s plan to conduct comprehensive psywar operations over print and broadcast media, and destabilizations in urban Christian areas, such as Davao International Airport, Awang Airport, Gen Santos City International Standard Airport, Zamboanga International Airport, Cagayan de Oro Airport, principal ports and wharves, foreign embassies and consulates, hotels and restaurants, shopping malls, hospitals, churches, public markets and terminals, radio and television stations, factories, oil depots and gasoline stations, buses, cinemas, schools, plazas and others must be intensified and thereafter put the blame on the MILF…”

Findings - On Feb 20, a car bomb exploded at the Awang Airport killing one person and injuring six others. While another bomb exploded at a public market in Kabacan, Cotabato killing one person and injuring ten others. The AFP put blame on the MILF as Lt. Col. Michael Manquiquis said: “One of the possibilities that we could consider is that it could be the MILF.” MILF Spokesman Eid Kabalu denied the charges. (16 dead as fresh violence sweeps Mindanao. Agence France-Presse. 20 Feb 03)

- On Feb 21, car bombs exploded simultaneously outside a shopping mall in Koronadal, South Cotabato. (3 hurt in bomb blast at South Cotabato mall. Inq7.net with Agence France-Presse. 21 Feb 03.

- On March 04, a bomb exploded at the arrival area of the Davao International Airport killing 19 persons. Minutes later, another bomb exploded inside a health office in nearby Tagum City, Davao, which left two people injured. (19 killed in Davao Blasts. Philippine Star. 05 Mar 03). The AFP points the blame to the MILF despite admissions by the Abu Sayyaf Group. (Malacañang, police junk Abu claim on Davao blast. Inq7.net. 05 Mar 03). The next day March 05, the MILF issued a statement condemning the Davao Airport bombing. (see Annex D)

* In an article of the Philippine Graphic, Datu Lacs Dalidig of the Muslim Multisectoral Movement for Peace and Development claimed that GMA admitted to him that the MILF was not responsible for the Davao Airport bombing. This admission, according to Dalidig, was made in the presence of former Exec. Sec. Renato de Villa, Sec. Norberto Gonzales, DSWD Sec. Corazon Soliman, and NAPC Sec. Ging Deles. The Graphic also got in touch with Sec. Gonzales during the Oakwood Incident and he admitted, “there were leads that indicated the MILF did not do it.” (GMA acknowledged Davao blast was work of ‘3rd Force’. Inday Espina-Varona. Graphic Special Issue Vol. 14 No. 9. 28 July 03)

- On April 02, a bomb exploded through a row of crowded food stalls outside the Sasa Wharf killing 16 persons and injuring 55 others. (Sasa port blast suspect arrested. Rex C. Otero. Sunstar.com. 05 Apr 03)

* Then ISAFP chief Gen. Victor Corpuz was seen in the morning of April 02 in Davao city by a key witness of the protesting soldiers in Oakwood. His presence in Davao city on the same day of the Sasa wharf bombing could only mean two things according to the protesting soldiers, either he was there to personally supervise a major “special operation”, or he was so incompetent that as head of the AFP’s Intelligence Service he never had a clue that a major terrorist activity was about to take place under his very nose.

- On April 03, three Davao City Mosques were bombed. (3 Davao Mosques Bombed. Philippine Star. 04 Apr 03)

- On May 10, a bomb (made out of 81 mm mortar cartridge) exploded in front of a public market in Koronadal, South Cotabato. (Over a dozen dead in bomb blast in S. Mindanao. Agence France-Presse, 10 May 03)

- On July 10, a bomb exploded at a crowded market in Koronadal, South Cotabato killing at least 6 people and injuring 20 others. (AFP: 6 killed, 20 hurt in Koronadal blast. Reuters/abs-cbnNEWS.com. 10 July 03)

11. FPPF - In para 4 it states, “…thereafter put the blame on the MILF so as to convince that Asean, the European Union, and the United States’ State Department to formally declare the MILF as a FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION…”

Findings - On April 22, GMA, in a speech in the University of Mindanao, Davao City, said: “The confession of captured Abu Sayyaf member Noor Muhammad Umug establishing the link of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to the arrested bombing suspects has strengthened evidence against the MILF as a terrorist group. (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

- On May 11, the Department of National Defense pushed for the inclusion of the MILF in the United States’ terror list. (DND eyes terror tag on MILF. Philippine Star. 12 May 03)

- On May 13, Sec. Bunye, in a press briefing, said: “there is a possibility of foreclosing the (Government-MILF) peace talks, if the MILF is eventually declared as a terrorist organization…” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

- On May 13, GMA said: “The government is nearing a decision point on whether to declare the MILF a terrorist organization, and to take the necessary operational and diplomatic measures to strengthen this prospective policy.” (President: MILF has until June 1 to cut terror links. Jose Guinto. Inq7.net with Agence France-Presse. 13 May 03)

12. FPPF - In para 4 it states “…the MILF’s designation as an FTO will ensure the smooth conduct of Balikatan 03-1 in Central Mindanao…”

Findings - The Balikatan 03-1 was originally slated in Sulu. (Sec. Bunye in a statement, PND News Release. 17 Feb 03). But on March 04, Sec. Bunye said: “We are not married to the idea of holding the Balikatan 03-1 in Sulu. The search is for other possible venues for Balikatan 03-1…” (PND News Release. 04 Mar 03)

- On March 12, GMA said: “I would not mind holding the Balikatan exercises in North Cotabato.” (PND News Release. 12 Mar 03)

- On March 17, GMA, in a radio interview, said: “It was the local government of (North) Cotabato, under Governor Emmanuel Piñol, that volunteered and asked that the Balikatan be conducted in their area.” (Downloaded from http://www.op.gov.ph/)

On the Objectives of OPLAN GREENBASE

Based on the two documents, the objectives of OPLAN GREENBASE have been deduced to the following:

1. To capture and occupy Buliok Complex and environs within one week.

2. To clear the Liguasan Marsh Area so that development projects can be implemented as concessions to the Libyan and Malaysian participation in the GRP-MILF peace talks.

3. To capture MILF Chair Salamat Hashim dead or alive.

4. To file criminal charges against MILF leaders.

5. To bomb Napocor transmission towers and power sub-stations, and blame the MILF.

6. To conduct comprehensive psywar operations and destabilizations in Urban Christian Areas and blame the MILF.

7. To convince the Asean, the European Union, and the United States to declare the MILF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (because of the terrorist activities to be blamed on them as stated in 5 and 6 above)

8. To transfer the venue for the conduct of the Balikatan 03-1 to Central Mindanao.

9. To resume formal Peace Talks once the objectives were achieved.

Findings - Based on the data gathered, objectives 1 to 6 were achieved. Objectives 7 and 8, while they have yet to be achieved, were attempted to by GMA and her officials to dangle as leverages or threats against the MILF. These were apparently grave enough to have the MILF capitulate and call for a 10-day unilateral ceasefire on June 02. (MILF declares 10-day unilateral ceasefire. Joel Guinto. inq7.net. 28 May 03)

As for Objective 9, both the GRP and MILF have declared a mutual ceasefire and the negotiations for the resumption of peace talks are now underway. (Philippine Government, MILF work out for renewed ceasefire. 20 July 03. downloaded from http://www.luwaran.com/)

ANALYSIS

In view of the above findings, the Greenbase Documents are not spurious as their contents were based on either true information or actual events. At the same time, almost all the objectives set forth in OPLAN GREENBASE were found to have been directly or indirectly achieved.

Therefore, the documents could not have been propaganda materials.

Still, the findings above are not enough to conclude that the documents or more specifically OPLAN GREENBASE is an action plan. The element needed to conclude it as such, is the time the documents were made. If the documents were made prior to the occurrence of events or the official pronouncements, then OPLAN GREENBASE is, indeed, an action plan. Otherwise, if the documents were made after, then it merely becomes a white paper.

To this, a reference would be made on the date when Sec. Bunye made a statement that the Greenbase Document is spurious and that is—27 February 2003 (see Bunye’s full statement in page 6 above).

This statement placed the time the documents were made at not later than the said date. On the assumption that it took at least two weeks before Sec. Bunye was able to get hold of a leaked copy, then it placed the time it was made at about the same date indicated in the document, which is 11 February 2003.

At that point in time, no one except those in the upper echelons of power could have had access to all the technical and classified information contained in the Greenbase Documents. Neither could anyone have accurately predicted the actions and pronouncements of the government nor the future events.

It is clear, therefore, that the contents of the Greenbase Documents are true and that OPLAN GREENBASE is a secret action plan authorized by GMA and executed by the DND, OPAPP and other government agencies.

CONCLUSION

With the revelation that the Greenbase Documents are true, comes a very frightening implication – that GMA and her administration can and will sacrifice the lives of innocent people she had sworn to serve and protect, in the pursuit of political, economic and personal interests.

The comprehensive peace policy of her Administration had been very promising while the signing of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities had been hoped by many as the first step to lasting peace in Mindanao that all Filipinos longed for.

But just like how she reneged on her Dec 30 vow not to run for President in 2004 and how she reneged on the Oakwood Agreements, she—full of deceit and betrayal—also reneged on this very sacred agreement and ordered an all-out war to the unsuspecting MILF secessionists.

The difference from the first two however is that, in the latter, hundreds of people died or were wounded—civilians, soldiers, and rebels alike; hundreds of thousands of families were displaced with the children left forever traumatized and deprived of education that would eventually force them to join the next generation of rebels; and billions were lost in damaged property and on relief and rehabilitation costs. All these enormous costs for a war that never should have been.

Finally, the Greenbase Documents validate the fear that state-sponsored terrorism had become a policy option in the GMA Administration. The Davao bombings and other bombings in Mindanao, which left hundreds of innocent civilians dead, are mass murders and works of evil minds and heartless individuals. At the very least, these horrible incidents shattered all the pretensions of democracy under the GMA Administration and effectively removed its very reason for existence.

ANNEX A

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 3
DEFINING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTUREFOR GOVERNMENT’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE EFFORTS

WHEREAS, a primary objective of the government is the attainment of a just, comprehensive and enduring peace under the rule of law and in accordance with constitutional processes, which is the basic foundation for sustainable economic and human development and national prosperity;

WHEREAS, a just comprehensive and enduring peace requires not merely the end of internal armed conflicts, but just as importantly the resolution of root causes of the armed conflicts and social unrest, transformation of Philippine society to one characterized by justice, equity, tolerance, harmonious pluralism, and full respect for human rights;

WHEREAS, the nationwide public consultations of the National Unification Commission recommended a comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process comprising “Three Principles and Six Paths to Peace” as necessary for the attainment of a just and enduring peace;

WHEREAS, this comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process was adopted as government policy under Executive Order No. 125, s. 1993, which created the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process;

WHEREAS, there is a desire to reaffirm the government’s continuing commitment to this comprehensive peace process and to consolidate its gains;

WHEREAS, in line with the Administration’s policy to reconstruct the peace process, there is a need to strengthen and streamline processes and rationalize structures towards an effective and integrated approach to the pursuit of peace, responsive to the changing situation of conflict in the country and lessons learned from the past implementation;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people’s participation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order;

Section 1. Scope. The government’s policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process, shall be governed by this Executive Order.

Section 2. The Systematic Approach to Peace. The government shall continue to pursue a comprehensive, integrated and holistic approach to peace that is guided by the principles and processes laid down in this Executive Order. These shall provide the framework for the implementation, coordination, monitoring and integration of all government peace initiatives, and guide its partnership with civil society in the pursuit of a just and enduring peace.

Section 3. The Three Principles of the Comprehensive Peace Process. The comprehensive peace process shall continue to be governed by the following underlying principles:

a. A comprehensive peace process should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipino. Thus, it shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.

b. A comprehensive peace process aims to forge a new social compact for a just, equitable, humane and pluralistic society. It seeks to establish a genuinely pluralistic society, where all individuals and groups are free to engage in peaceful competition for predominance of their political programs without fear, through the exercise of rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and where they may compete for political power through an electoral system that is free, fair and honest.

c. A comprehensive peace process seeks a principled and peaceful resolution to the internal armed conflicts, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned.

Section 4. The Six Paths to Peace. The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the “Paths to Peace”. These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:

a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation, or even constitutional amendments.

b. CONSENSUS-BUILDING AND EMPOWERMENT FOR PEACE. This component includes continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s participation in the peace process.

c. PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS.
This component involves the conduct of face-to-face negotiations to reach peaceful settlement with the different rebel groups. It also involves the effective implementation of peace agreements.

d. Program for reconciliation, reintegration into mainstream society and rehabilitation. This component includes programs to address the legal status and security of former rebels, as well as community-based assistance programs to address the economic, social and psychological rehabilitation needs of former rebels, demobilized combatants and civilian victims of the internal armed conflict.

e. ADDRESSING CONCERNS ARISING FORM CONTINUING ARMED HOSTILITIES. This component involves the strict implementation of laws and policy guidelines, and the institution of programs to ensure the protection of non-combatants and reduce the impact of the armed conflict on communities found in conflict areas.

f. BUILDING AND NURTURING A CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO PEACE. This component includes peace advocacy and peace education programs, and the implementation of various confidence- building measures.

Section 5. Administrative Structure. The administrative Structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process shall be as follows:

a. THE PRESIDENCY. The President shall exercise active and focused leadership that is essential for the effective pursuit of the comprehensive peace process.

b. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON THE PEACE PROCESS. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) shall be charged with the management and supervision of the comprehensive peace process. The PAPP shall be appointed by the President and shall have the rank and remuneration of a Cabinet Member. He shall have the authority to coordinate and integrate, in behalf of the President, all existing peace efforts. As such, the PAPP shall have direct supervision and control over the specific structures and programs designed for the implementation of the comprehensive peace process. He shall have the following functions and responsibilities:

1) Advise and assist the President in the management, direction and supervision of the comprehensive peace process;

2) Recommend to the President policies, programs and actions to implement thecomprehensive peace process;

3) Report to the President on the progress of implementation of the comprehensive peace process;

4) Supervise the government agencies and instrumentalities, to include their program and activities, purposely created for the implementation of various components of the comprehensive peace process, such as the Government Peace Negotiating Panels and the National Program for Unification and Development;

5) Coordinate with the other government agencies involved in the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, including the National Amnesty Commission and the National Anti-Poverty Commission, as well as the various departments and instrumentalities which should participate or provide support to the overall effort;

6) Conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments and recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process.

7) Perform such other functions as directed by the President.

c. GOVERNMENT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANELS. There shall be establishedGovernment Peace Negotiating Panels (GPNPs) for negotiations with different rebel groups, to be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who shall be appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups. They shall report to the President, through the PAPP, on the conduct and progress of their negotiations.

The GPNPs shall each be provided technical support by a Panel Secretariat under the direct control and supervision of the respective Panel Chairmen. They shall be authorized to hire consultants and to organize their own Technical Committees to assist in the technical requirements for the negotiations.Upon conclusion of a final peace agreement with any of the rebel groups, the concerned GPNP shall be dissolved. Its Panel Secretariat shall be retained in the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) for the purpose of providing support for the monitoring of the implementation of the peace agreement.

d. PANEL OF ADVISERS. There shall be Panel of Advisers for each of the GPNPs, composed of representatives from the Senate, House of Representatives, members of the Cabinet and representatives of civil society and other advisers as may be designated by the President upon recommendation of the PAPP, which shall function as an advisory body to their respective GPNPs on the conduct of their negotiations.

Section 6. National Program for Unification and Development Council. The National Program for Unification and Development Council (NPUDC) shall be charged with the implementation of programs for the reconciliation and reintegration into mainstream society of former rebels, through area-based projects and activities to address their economic, social and psychological rehabilitation needs.

Section 7. The National Amnesty Commission. The National Amnesty Commission (NAC) shall take charge of the government’s amnesty program to address the legal status and security of former combatants. The PAPP shall be in active coordination with the NAC in ensuring the appropriate response of government to the needs of former combatants.

Section 8. The National Peace Forum. To crystallize the partnership between the government and civil society in the pursuit of a just and enduring peace, there shall be a National Peace Forum (NPF) which shall function as an advisory body to the PAPP. It shall be the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advise from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government-civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives.

Section 9. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) shall provide technical and administrative support to the PAPP in the discharge of his functions for the coordination and implementation of all components of the comprehensive peace process.

The secretariat of the National Peace Forum (NPF) established under EO 115, s. 1999 shall be integrated into and function as a component unit of the OPAPP.

Administrative support services for the GPNP’s shall be provided by the OPAPP.

Section 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. Subject to the approval of the Office of the President, the PAPP shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Executive Order.

Section 11. Funding. The approved budgets of the OPAPP, the National Program for Unification and Development Council and the National Peace Forum for the current year shall be the source of funds for the implementation of the comprehensive peace process for the year 2001. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the OPAPP and other agencies concerned.

Section 12. Repealing Clause. All Executive Orders, rules and regulations and other issuances, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 13. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 28th day of February in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand One.

By the President:RENATO S. DE VILLAExecutive Secretary

ANNEX B
MALACAÑANGMANILA
February 11, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF INSTRUCTIONS
TO : THE SECRETARY Department of National Defense Camp Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo QUEZON CITY

This Memorandum prescribes the Constitutional obligation of the Government to preserve its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to prevent the Southern Philippines Secessionists (SPS), particularly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), from dismembering the Republic.

As President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I do hereby order the following:

1. Effective 121400H FEB 2003, I order that the OPLAN GREENBASE must be totally implemented without prejudice to the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace. The GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities is hereby suspended indefinitely. The formal talks with the MILF may resume provided the objective of OPLAN GREENBASE is completely accomplished in order that the Government can impose its will upon the MILF to accept “Enhanced Autonomy” or face total pacification in the hands of the AFP.

2. The AFP must CAPTURE AND OCCUPY simultaneously within one week the Buliok Complex fronting the Liguasan Marsh area comprising: (a) Kabasalan Island Complex, (b) Rajamuda Complex, and (c) Buliok Complex where Salamat Hashim’s headquarteres “Islamic Center” is located. To achieve this objective, the entire forces and war assets of Southern Command with the air support of the Philippine Air Force must be fully utilized.

The Buliok Complex has been identified by the SouthCom as the base of operations and refuge area of the notorious Pentagon kidnap-for-ransom group and other heavily armed criminal groups in Mindanao.Once the objective of the plan is achieved, the AFP must clear the Liguasan Marsh of all MILF structures – military, political and social – and lawless elements, and relocate the civilians living in the marsh.

3. I have instructed the Department of Energy Secretary to revive the Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract (Cotabato Basin Exploration Project) between Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and the Philippine National Oil Corporation Exploration Corporation as the draft Farm-in Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement between the PNOC and Petronas are ready for signing.

The joint exploration of the oil fields of marsh will ensure national economic recovery in anticipation of peso devaluation against the US dollar, and the oil price increase in the world market resulting from the impending US-Iraq war. Proper coordination with the Energy Department is vital to the success of the exploration.

4. I have further ordered the NEDA Director-General to implement the much-delayed 25-year Liguasan Marsh Development Framework Plan and to reconstitute the Liguasan Marsh Development Task Force as soon as the AFP takes full control of the marsh from the MILF.

5. Serve the warrants of arrest issued against Samier Hashim, Ustaz Salamat Hashim, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and Eid Kabalu by various Courts two years ago. The AFP must bear in mind that the HIGH-VALUE TARGET of the plan is TO CAPTURE SALAMAT HASHIM DEAD OR ALIVE. The neutralization of Tahir Alonto will only be effected after the MILF leaders above-mentioned are arrested, jailed or killed.

6. In implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), and the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) must ensure that all evacuees in the war-affected barangays of Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat provinces are orderly evacuated to different schools or government center in the nearest town poblacions. The Office of the President – Mindanao and the 6th Infantry (K) Division, Philippine Army shall strictly supervise the implementation of the Special Economic Enhancement and Development Program for Pikit as well as the relief and rehabilitation of the affected civilians and ensure that their needs are well-attended to prevent the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the United Nations agencies, such as Decolonization Commission, UN High Commission for Refugees, UN Human Rights Commission, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent Society from deeply looking into the present war against the MILF and the Moros.

7. It is desired that all matters pertinent hereto shall be fully coordinated with the Presidential Adviser for the Peace Process and the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns.
Copy furnished:OPAPP

Sgd
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

*Author’s note: This document was re-typed so that its full text could be viewed as reference since to scan and include the actual photocopied Greenbase documents in this MS Word file would require more space and would be more difficult to spread through email. However, should you want to view the photocopied document, it could be emailed to you.

ANNEX C

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESOffice of the PresidentOFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON THE PEACE PROCESS

THE PRESIDENT’S FOUR-POINTPOLICY FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING THESOUTHERN PHILIPPINES SECESSIONISTS/MILF PROBLEM(Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of InstructionsApproved on 11 February 2003)

1. The Government’s high-value target in the implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE is to CAPTURE MILF CHAIRMAN HASHIM SALAMAT DEAD OR ALIVE. To this effect, the AFP must CAPTURE AND OCCUPY Buliok Complex and environs within a week of continuous, massive aerial and infantry attacks to permanently deprive the MILF and its leadership of setting up future guerilla bases in the marsh and elsewhere in Mindanao.

With the capture of all MILF camps, the Government, with the active participation of the local government units in the area, must establish an Area of Temporary Stay (ATS) where the MILF rebels and their surviving leaders can be concentrated to avoid “mis-encounters” while negotiations for their total capitulation are going on.

Member-countries of the OIC Committee of Eight may be allowed to visit members of the MILF peace panel in an ATS provided officials designated by the National Security Council and/or the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security are privy to every minute details of their talks. No private or closed-door conversations shall be allowed during the visit.

Accordingly, the Government shall assert and uphold its authority and solemn duty under the Constitution - preserve our territorial integrity as one nation, maintain law and order, and protect the civilian population through effective military and police actions against terrorism and other forms of lawless violence perpetrated y the MILF and other rebel groups to which it has established alliance, i.e. CPP-NPA-NDF, MNLF-Misuari Renegade Group, MNLF Executive Council of 15, and MNLF-Alvarez Isnaji Wing.

This will ensure the Government’s authority to correct past mistakes done by the GRP peace panels in every agreement reached with the MILF. Under this disadvantageous situation, the MILF can now freely accept the Government-offered "Enhanced Autonomy" while garrisoned in their ATS.

2. Without prejudice to the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001, the Government has indefinitely suspended the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. To this end, the Government will set up an acceptable monitoring team composed of PNP and AFP officials to monitor effectively any cease-fire mechanism that could be devised by the Defense Department.

The duties and functions of an OIC Monitoring Team that should have been composed under the existing agreement are hereby vested to this Government-sponsored monitoring team.

3. The Government invokes its right for the MILF to fully observe the May 6, 2002 joint communique where the MILF agreed to interdict criminal elements taking refuge in their remaining controlled areas, particularly the petroleum-rich Liguasan Marsh where Hashim Salamat’s P7.5 million worth “Islamic Center Mansion” is situated.

Once the MILF is driven away from the marsh, NEDA can now take off after a few years of a halt to the 25-year Liguasan Marsh Development Framework Plan. The draft Farm-In Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement between PNOC-EC and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd can now be assigned in due time for the exploration of the Marsh’s huge oil deposits. Likewise the LGUs of Cotabato province and Pikit can now start implemenitnfg the Special Economic Ehancenment and Development Program for Pikit (Seed Pikit).

Following the projected defeat of MILF in the Liguasan war, the Government through the National Development Co. will be in a better position to fully implement the US$ 100 million joint venture Manila-Tripoli-Kuala Lumpur palm oil and sugarcane plantations confidential deal being hammered out by the President as a promissory concession once the two countries agreed to actively meddle in a peace talk with the MILF. It will be pushed through without prejudice to any unlikely diplomatic reaction of Washington since both countries antagonize the US Government due to its war mongering against Iraq and Libya.

4. The MILF must be held responsible for the AFP-backed spate of bombings in urban areas and destruction of several Napocor transmission towers, power sub-station and barges, the Mt. Apo Geothermal Power Plant, the Pulangi Power Plant and power plants of electric cooperatives and companies in Mindanao. Appropriate charges of rebellion, sedition, multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder will be filed against MILF leaders in various courts in order to secure warrants of arrest against them and reduce them in estoppel.

The AFP’s plan to conduct comprehensive psywar operations over print and broadcast media, and destabilization in urban Christian areas, such as Davao International Airport, Awang Airport, Gen, Santos City International Standard Airport, Zamboanga International, Cagayan de Oro Airport, principal ports and wharves, foreign embassies and consulates, hotels and restaurants, shopping malls, hospitals, churches, public markets and terminals, radio and television stations, factories, oil depots and gasoline stations, busses, cinemas, schools, plazas and then must be intensified and thereafter put the blame on the MILF so as to convince the Asean, the European Union, and the United States’ State Department to formally declare the MILF as a FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, and Chairman Hashim Salamat as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist because of the gravity and magnitude of threat he and the MILF pose on the national security and territorial integrity of the Philippines and Asean countries.

Hashim's’capture or death, and MILF's designation as an FTO will ensure the smooth conduct of Balikatan 03-1 in Central Mindanao and the US troops' planned basing in Sarangani-Gen. Santos City.
Sgd:
Eduardo Ermita/30

*Author’s note: This document was re-typed so that its full text could be viewed as reference since to scan and include the actual photocopied Greenbase documents in this MS Word file would require more space and would be more difficult to spread through email. However, should you want to view the photocopied document, it could be emailed to you.

annex D
MILF PRESS RELEASEMarch 5, 2003

MILF STRONGLY CONDEMNS LATEST BOMB BLASTS AT THEDAVAO CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON MARCH 4, 2003 AT 5:30 PM, LEAVING MANY CASUALTIES, AT LEAST 18 PERSONS DEAD AND 98 WOUNDED, AND DAMAGES TO PROPERTIES AT THE AIRPORT.

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF), PARTICULARLY BROTHER SALAMAT HASHIM, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILF CENTRAL COMMITTEE, STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE LATEST BOMB BLASTS AT THE DAVAO CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THAT OCCURRED TODAY, MARCH 4, 2003 AT 5:30 P.M., WHICH LEFT AT LEAST 18 DEAD AND 98 WOUNDED, INCLUDING THE SUBSEQUENT BOMB BLASTS IN TAGUM CITY WHICH ALSO VICTIMIZED CIVILIANS.

THE MILF BELIEVES THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE HORRIBLE AND DASTARDLY ACT HAVE NO SENSE OF CARE ON, OR DO NOT VALUE HUMAN LIVES, EVEN AS THEY COMMITTED THIS BARBARIC AND COWARD ACT IRREGARDLESS OF THE PLACE THEY CHOSE TO COMMIT THE CRIME. MANY PEOPLE WERE THEN AT THE WAITING SHADE OF THE AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING WAITING FOR THE PLANE PASSENGERS WHO JUST ARRIVED.

MEANWHILE, THE MILF HEREBY SUGGESTS TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT THAT THESE INCIDENTS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED AND NO STONE TO BE LEFT UNTURNED UNTIL THE PERPETRATORS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE TO ANSWER FOR THE HEINOUS CRIME THEY HAVE COMMITTED AGAINST HUMANITY. THE MILF, AS ITS DUTY IN ISLAM, IS WILLING TO ASSIST THE INVESTIGATION OF THESE TWO BOMBING INCIDENTS BY THE AUTHORITIES.

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT A SIMILAR BOMB ATTACH ALSO TOOK PLACE AT THE AWANG AIRPORT IN DATU ODIN SINSUAT, MAGUINDANAO LAST FEBRUARY 20, 2002, WHICH RAZED TO THE GROUND SEVERAL BUILDINGS, AND ALSO LEFT MANY CASUALTIES. THE INCIDENT WAS READILY ADMITTED BY THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP THOUGH.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE(March 4, 2003)
AL HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM Vice Chairman

*Author’s note: This document was re-typed so that its full text could be viewed as reference since to scan and include the actual photocopied Greenbase documents in this MS Word file would require more space and would be more difficult to spread through email. However, should you want to view the photocopied document, it could be emailed to you.

WHO IS ANTONIO TRILLANES

2006-12-01T01:12:00.000-08:00

ANTONIO FUENTES TRILLANES IV

PERSONAL

Date of Birth: 06 August 1971
Place of Birth: Manila
Spouse: Arlene G. Orejana
Children: Francis Seth O. Trillanes
Thea Estelle O. Trillanes
Alan Andrew O. Trillanes (deceased)

EDUCATION

Elementary: Sienna College, Quezon City
1975-1983

Secondary: Angelicum School, Quezon City
1983-1987

College: BS ECE (4th Year); De La Salle University, Manila
1987-1991

BS Naval Systems Engineering; Philippine Military Academy
1991-1995

Awards: Cum Laude

Mathematics Plaque
Physical Sciences Plaque

Tambuli Award (Electrical/Electronics Engineering)

Graduate: Master in Public Administration major in Public Policy and Program Management; University of the Philippines, Diliman
2000-2005

Awards: two (2) University Scholar Awards (GPA 1.0-1.25)
College Scholar Award (GPA 1.25-1.50)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Sea Duty Profile: Mess & Supply Officer
April 1995-May 1996
Deck & Gunnery Officer
May 1996-January 1998
Engineering & Damage Control Officer
January 1998-February 1999
Executive Officer
February 1999-January 2000
Acting Commanding Officer
June 1999-January 2000
Shore Duty: Administrative/Personnel Officer (P1), HQ Patrol Force
June 1999-January 2000
Procurement Officer/Instructor, Naval Education & Training Command
January 2000-June 2001

PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS

He was one of the Navy personnel who risked their lives to rescue thirty-two (32) persons during a daring search and rescue operation for the survivors of the ill-fated M/V Princess of the Orient at the height of a super typhoon in 1998.

He has a five-year sea duty experience logging-in a Total Steaming Time (TST) of 2,593 hrs and 47 min and Total Miles Covered (TMC) of 35, 316.78 nautical miles. During which time, his unit was responsible for the apprehension of dozens of smugglers, illegal loggers, poachers, human smugglers and illegal fishermen in numerous maritime law enforcement operations conducted in the waters off Batanes, Ilocos, Cagayan, Isabela, Zambales, Scarborough, Quezon, Bicol, Palawan, Mindoro, Romblon, Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Davao and Maguindanao.

He was involved in numerous naval operations in support of ground operations directed against the Abu Sayyaf and other lawless elements.

As procurement officer of the Naval Training and Education Command, Philippine Navy, he reformed the procurement system, which resulted in the accumulated savings of more than four million pesos in favor of the government.

He has participated in 22 naval exercises conducted with local and foreign navies.

He is a recipient of 23 assorted merit medals, campaign ribbons and badges.

A Study of Corruption in the Philippine Navy

2006-12-01T00:29:00.000-08:00

By:
LTJG ANTONIO F TRILLANES IV PN
October 2001

INTRODUCTION

On 26 May 2001, Abu Sayyaf bandits kidnapped 20 persons from Dos Palmas, an up-scale resort in Palawan. The next day, a joint task force was formed to conduct pursuit operations (PDI, 27 May 2001). On 28 May, a reconnaissance plane spotted the kidnappers’ group aboard three boats approaching the Mapun Island Group (MIG)(PDI, 28 May 2001).

Immediately, four navy patrol crafts were dispatched to conduct a naval blockade on the island. Then finally on 31 May, Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya claimed that they have slipped through the naval blockade and are now in Sulu and Basilan (PDI, 31 May 2001).

Presidential Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao quickly forgave the Navy for its ineffectiveness when he said: "the gunmen’s boats had top speeds of 40 knots, way beyond the capability of the Philippine Navy.

Using that type of craft they would have eaten up the wide expanse of Sulu Sea between Palawan and Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi (Mapun) in five hours" (PDI, 28 May 2001). Tiglao further stressed: "The biggest problem really is the Philippine Navy has few patrol boats. There are plans to increase the number of these patrol boats" (PDI, 28 May 2001).

These statements coming from the presidential spokesperson clearly signified three things: First, is the cluelessness of the GMA Administration as regards the true situation on the ground and its total reliance on sanitized information given by the AFP leadership; Second, is its ignorance on the capabilities of its navy; Last, is the GMA Administration’s penchant for tolerating grossly incompetent acts of the AFP, in this case the Navy, due to her political indebtedness to it for being primarily responsible for installing her as President of the Republic.

The kidnappers actually used motor launches (lancha) that run a measly 12 knots as seen by the Air Force reconnaissance plane and reported to the Western Command. This probably explains why the kidnappers reportedly took two days (and not 5 hours as Tiglao said) to travel from Dos Palmas to MIG. Besides, the kumpit (fast motor boats used by smugglers in the South), while it is true that it can run up to 40 knots (without load), it is never used for prolonged sorties as it easily runs out of fuel.

Its reported fuel consumption is approx 500 liters/hr at speed of 40 knots. For it to traverse Dos Palmas to Mapun and eventually to Basilan, they would need space for at least 10 drums of fuel aside from the space that the kidnappers and hostages would occupy. For a sleek boat, which measures no more than 60 feet, this is impossible unless they had a convoy of at least 5 kumpits, which is totally unheard of, and costs around P25 million.

The four navy patrol crafts should have successfully blockaded MIG, which only has a land area of approximately 30 square nautical miles (n.mi.), had they been deployed correctly. Each craft has a navigational/surface search radar that has an effective scanning radius of 6 n.mi.. This means that if properly positioned, the four patrol crafts’ radar sweeps should have overlapped at least at the middle, thus covering the whole MIG upto 3 n.mi. off the coastlines. However, as it happened the Task Group Commander in charge of the blockade, relying heavily on intelligence reports, positioned all four crafts 1n.mi off Tandatao Pt of Mapun mainland at 500-yard intervals thus minimizing their surface search capabilities.

The Naval Special Warfare Group team that landed in the area supposedly to rescue the hostages found out that indeed one of the boats used was anchored near Tandatao Pt, but the kidnappers’ group was either in Pamelikan Is or Binlut Is, the northern islands of MIG and both were way beyond radar range from where the crafts were positioned thus, enabling the group to slip off to Basilan.

The escape of the Abu Sayyaf through the naval blockade was one tactical blunder that caused great humiliation and enormous costs to the country. To be simply ignored and forgiven by the President (through Tiglao’s statement) was a display of weakness as a Commander-In-Chief of the AFP.

But the President could not have been that stupid and weak, as this gesture had showed. Thus, it is rather safe to conclude that, as mentioned earlier, it was her political indebtedness and fear of the AFP that prevented her from imposing sanctions lest she suffers the same fate as former President Estrada through another "withdrawal of support" by the AFP.

These unfortunate political concessions, first demonstrated in the case of RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP during the PN leadership crisis that occurred in February 2001(to be discussed later in this paper), while it would favor certain officers, could further deteriorate the Navy, and the AFP.

While it would seem that the incident cited above has dwelt more on incompetence and ineffectiveness, this paper will show that this is just one manifestation of the ill effects of corruption in the Navy. More specifically, how corruption made this incident even possible to happen in the first place.

Through the years, the Navy top brass have always raised the issues of obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the fleet to cover for the Navy’s ineffectiveness. But is this really the case? Or, is it simply caused by an institutionalized corruption that exists in all levels and in all areas of the organization? If so, then what is the cost? How could this problem be solved? These are the questions that this paper intends to answer.

In going about the discussion, a brief look at the history of the Navy will be necessary to appreciate its importance and relevance to the country. Other basic facts about the organization will also be laid down to provide the necessary backdrop to the main subject of the paper.

THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

THE PAST

The Insurgent Navy

The Philippine Navy traces its roots way back to the Philippine Revolution against Spain with the hand-over by the Americans of a captured Spanish steam pinnace to Gen Emilio Aguinaldo on 20 May 1898. The vessel was renamed Magdalo and emerged as the first watercraft of the navy. Soon, several other merchant ships donated by patriots were added to form a nascent fleet. The Insurgent Navy was instrumental to the revolutionary cause through its conduct of basic naval operations such as troop deployments and arms shipments. The first successful amphibious assault against a Spanish garrison was even spearheaded by the Magdalo at Bacoor Bay on 26 May 1898. Its effectiveness went on throughout the Fil-Am War. However, after the capture of Pres. Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901, the insurgent navy disintegrated. (Zulueta, 1998: 20)

The Off-Shore Patrol

The Navy was reborn with the creation of the Off-Shore Patrol (OSP) on 14 April 1938. A few patrol crafts and three high-speed torpedo boats, also known as Q-boats, were the pioneers of this force.

They were intended to form part of a nucleus of 55 Q-boats that would repel enemy amphibious landings as Gen Douglas McArthur had envisioned. But before the acquisition of more Q-boats, war had broken out. As a consequence, the OSP was relegated to other roles such as; troop insertions, intelligence operations and ferry missions.

Though they had a few skirmishes with Japanese Navy ships and warplanes, after the fall of Bataan on 08 April 1942, all ships of the OSP had to be scuttled. (Giagonia, 1997: 147)

The Post-War Navy

After World War II, the country had a surplus of war materiel given by the US. Among which were 83 ships of various types. Thus the OSP was reorganized and upgraded into the Philippine Naval Patrol, to become a major command of the AFP.

On 23 December 1950, through E.O. 389, the Philippine Naval Patrol was renamed as the Philippine Navy. (Giagonia, 1997: 245) For the next four decades, the Navy experienced a confluence of events and performed various roles in furtherance of national security interests and national development. In the 1950’s, the significant roles were to conduct counter insurgency operations against the Hukbalahap and ferry missions during the Korean War.

These were followed by the anti-smuggling and anti piracy operations in Sulu where the Navy was credited for destroying the network of illegal operations of the most notorious band of pirates and outlaws, including the dreaded Kamlon. The 1960’s were highlighted by activities such as the ferry missions during the Vietnam War and by the bilateral and multi-lateral naval exercises that further strengthened the Navy’s maritime defense posture in the region.

The anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations in the south were also sustained during this era (Giagonia, 1997: 247-272). Throughout the 1970’s up to the early 1980’s, the Navy reverted to its counter-insurgency mode this time against two fronts, the Muslim secessionists and the communists (Zulueta, 1998: 44).

During the 1986 EDSA Revolt, eighty five percent of the Navy joined the rebels led by then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and then AFP Vice Chief of Staff and PC Chief Fidel V Ramos. ( Giagonia, 1997: 310) According to Zulueta: "By the time things were simmering down to a semblance of peace quiet in the early 1990’s, the American naval and air forces, stung by the Philippine Senate’s rejection of a treaty that would have prolonged their stay in the Philippines, were leaving in a huff.

Suddenly, the Philippines saw its ‘surrogate’ navy and air force heading for the gates of Subic and Clark, leaving the resident highly anxious about its national defense." (Zulueta, 1998: 46) Commo Jose Francisco, former FOIC, on commenting about the American withdrawal, aptly stated "All throughout the years the Americans were here, we had the military assistance agreement with them and logistical support from them, and all that the government had to do was pay our salaries. What happened was that we had an indigestion.

We knew it would not last, but when it did end, we were at a loss" (Zulueta, 1998: 46). Rightly so, among the benefits the Navy had when the US bases were still around were: the US Military Assistance Program (USMAP), the equipment hand-me-down program of the US; the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), part of the bases rental fees are channeled back to the AFP for the purchase of surplus US military hardware or ship repair packages; use of floating drydock and other facilities; foreign training programs and technical consultations; and the security blanket for external threats. (The latter could arguably be considered a benefit since it could also be because of this dependence, the Philippine Navy never got to prepare to become an independent and credible navy by the time the Americans left.)

THE PRESENT

Mission

The Navy today has for its mission "to conduct prompt and sustained naval operations in support of the AFP’s mission". (NOQC Naval Orientation Reference Handguide, 1997).

Functions

1. Provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of the Philippines and to protect the people from external threats.
2. Conduct naval operations in support of air and ground operations.
3. Conduct maritime law enforcement within the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Promote safety of life at sea and environment protection.
5. Assist in national development efforts.
Organization (see Annex A)

Resources
Personnel - 1,687 Officers (see Annex B)
10,561 EP
Marines - 387 Officers
7,142 EP

Budget - P6,014,191,000.00 (see Annex C)
(Source: GAA 2000)
Assets -
Total Operating
Patrol Ships - 14 3
Patrol Boats - 35 10
Transport Ships - 9 4
Auxiliary Ships - 8 2
Patrol Craft - 32 17
Service Craft - 19 9
Aircraft:
Fixed wing - 9 4
Rotary - 5 2
*Operational Readiness:
Ships - 38.5%
Aircraft - 42.8%

Capabilities

- Limited Surface Warfare
- Naval Gunfire Support
- Amphibious Warfare
- Sealift Operations
- Domestic sea control
- Search and Rescue

Present Role in Society

The traditional role of any navy is to obtain "sea control" when necessary. Sea control is the ability of a fleet to control certain maritime areas (Mahan, 1885) for whatever purposes it may serve.

It involves deployment of naval forces to engage, destroy or repel enemy naval forces and carries with it the right to forbid passage through capture or destruction (Agudelo, 1994: 25). While the Navy can obtain sea control within our territorial waters, it cannot do so beyond it.

This is due to the fact that our fleet could not match-up to any of our neighbors’ navies. Thus, the Navy today cannot perform its primary mandated task to provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of the Philippines and protect the people from all external threats.

With this, the role of the Navy has been relegated to conducting internal security operations and maritime law enforcement. But the Philippines, with its recognition as an archipelagic state where, according to Zulueta, "the islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity", these roles seemed as paramount to the survival of the state as naval defense. (Zulueta, 1998: 14)

Internal Security Operations (ISO) involve naval gunfire support, amphibious and sealift operations. These are defined in an operations plan and are conducted often in conjunction with air and ground forces. For the past decades, the Navy had been very active in this role in support of counter-insurgency operations.

On the other hand, Maritime Law Enforcement (MARLEN) is actually the primary role of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), which was separated from the Navy and transferred to the Department of Transportation and Communication in 1998. However, due to the PCG’s lack of surface assets and also due to the wide expanse of the Philippine waters that include the EEZ, the Navy was deputized by various government agencies to enforce their specific laws. MARLEN involves the conduct of active and passive patrols to achieve naval presence in areas were illegal activities are perceived to be rampant.

While it is a known fact that several Navy ships are of World War II vintage, most of the boats/crafts that conduct MARLEN operations are new and acquired only in the mid-90’s. They are highly effective for coastal patrols being armed with 25 mm cannons and have maximum speeds of 30 knots.

FORMS AND LOCI OF CORRUPTION CORRUPTION DEFINED

Corruption, according to Sosmena, is "defined as a dysfunctional and pathological act that negates the accomplishment of its constitutional mandate of promoting public interest" (Sosmena, 1999: 6). While according to Klitgaard, "it is the misuse of a public office for personal gain." (Sosmena, 1999)

Corruption may be categorized in two ways: individualized or systemic (Carino, 1985: 15). Individualized corruption is where a person performs a secret moneymaking act in relation to his duties as public official or government employee. While systemic corruption is committed in an agency where, according to Caiden, "corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized that organizational supports back wrong-doing and actually penalizes those who live up to the old norms" (Caiden, 1977: 306).

Carino says further, that it is "demonstrated when bureaucrats and clients can describe the same illegal process, including such details as bribery rates per service and the way these are shared among the members of the syndicate throughout the agency. Those with ‘initiative’ and ‘daring’ share the largesse with their colleagues with less opportunities, thus engulfing everyone in an administrative culture that tolerates, even idolizes, the fruits of corruption". (Carino, 1985: 15)

LOCI OF CORRUPTION

The loci of corruption in the Navy are found in two distinct areas: in operational activities, which are ship-based and in administrative and support activities, which are shore-based. Ship-based activities include individual Navy ship activities and Naval Task Forces (NTF) directly involved in naval operations. Shore-based activities, meanwhile, include operations or functions of the various staff/support units such as personnel, intelligence, logistics, finance, training, etc. Under these are the various forms of corruption, which are not necessarily peculiar to each.

Ship-based Corruption

Direct bribery – "Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through mediation of another..." (Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code 1987)

Case illustration #1

On or about 1600H of 07 June 1995, while patrol ship PS1 was anchored off Sacol Island, Zamboanga while conducting a naval blockade against Abu Sayyaf Group reportedly hiding on the said island, a medium-sized lancha was sighted suspiciously steaming nearby. Upon sensing its possible hostile intentions, the crew of PS1 signaled it to come alongside. The lancha was then inspected and it yielded P11 million worth of smuggled goods. It was also reported that two Navy patrol crafts were sighted approaching the lancha but were observed to have reversed their course when the lancha unintentionally went near PS1.

During interrogation aboard PS1, the master patron confessed that they were hired to transport the goods from Sandakan, Malaysia to a designated place near the coast of Zamboanga City. They were further instructed to rendezvous with Navy patrol crafts that will escort them to the drop-off point.

The lancha and its crew were then apprehended and its goods were confiscated.

* This special "escort" arrangement is common to the small patrol crafts assigned in Naval Forces South. The personnel assigned in these crafts are particularly vulnerable to bribes since these are the workhorses of the fleet that conduct MARLEN patrols. The bribe package includes a monthly rice and cash incentives for the crew plus repair expenses for the craft. A utility boy is also provided who also doubles as courier on behalf of the smuggler.

Case illustration # 2

On Aug 1999, a patrol gunboat (PG1) along with three other patrol crafts received a directive from NTF61 to conduct naval blockade/MARLEN patrols at designated areas in Sulu Sea, several n.miles off Jolo Is.

Also contained in the directive was an intelligence report stating that there will be an attempt that evening to smuggle in assorted firearms and explosives to the island. PG1 and the other crafts then proceeded as ordered and vigilantly kept watch over their designated areas where the Muslim extremists were supposed to pass as stated in the directive. The following morning, the PN boats returned to port empty handed. A few days later, the NTF61 operations officer invited fellow officers to a drinking spree.

There he openly bragged that he just got a payoff amounting to P100,000.00 from a known big-time smuggler. The payoff was for letting the smugglers pass through a few nights ago without being apprehended by ensuring that their sea-lanes were cleared of Navy patrol boats. This he did by directing all patrol boats to proceed to their designated areas far away from these sea-lanes.
*It is common knowledge for Naval intelligence operatives that only small-time smugglers would dare dash their way through the waters of the South.

Their merchandise are often blue seal cigarettes, ukay-ukay or small quantities of lumber. However, most of them are armed with machine guns and sometimes have armed escorts. On the other hand, big-time smugglers, pirates and bandits (including the Abu Sayyaf) will never venture out into the Philippine waters unless they are given "clearance" by the Navy, Customs and PNP personnel (the Navy mole in these transactions is usually the operations officer of the NTF). They would not risk losing their valuable merchandise, which include arms, explosives, drugs and other contraband, to a crusading Navy captain patrolling the high seas.

Another given fact is that the bulk of the arms supply of the MILF are sea-borne. MILF Commanders use big-time smugglers as fronts to conduct their transshipment operations. This form of bribery is also common in Quezon province where illegal logging is rampant and in the Northern coasts of Luzon where all forms of smuggling are being conducted.

Extortion – a crime "committed by means of intimidation of persons, that is, by extorting money from a person. In cases where a law enforcer has apprehended a person committing a crime and the officer demands money from the culprit as the price for not arresting or prosecuting him, even if the latter is willing to give money, there is nevertheless some element of intimidation because of the threat of impending arrest or prosecution. (Aquino, 1987: 427)

Case illustration # 3

On or about 1900H of 14 May 1999, the Commanding Officer (CO) of a patrol gunboat (PG2) assigned in Davao, received an intelligence report stating that a known smuggler will attempt to smuggle contraband that evening to the southern coast of Davao. Immediately, PG2 was off to sea to conduct patrols to intercept the unknown craft. A few hours later, PG2 picked-up a radar contact a few miles off their position. As the patrol gunboat approached, the crew noticed that boat was unlighted yet it was running at a steady speed, an obvious indication of a smuggling activity. PG2 then overtook the suspected smuggling boat and conducted inspection.

True enough, the boat yielded contraband worth at least P2 million. After the inspection, the patron was invited inside PG2 for interrogation. Present during the investigation were the CO, Executive Officer (EXO), Chief Master At Arms (CMAA) and the patron of the boat.

Upon being seated in the wardroom, the CO said to the patron: "Didiretsohin na kita, magbigay ka ng P100,000.00 at pakakawalan kita." The patron haggled for a while but eventually agreed. He then went back to his boat and after a few minutes, returned to PG2. The patron gave a bag to the CO, who then counted the money inside. Satisfied with the transaction, the CO ordered the boat to be released. The CO then went inside his room with the bag in hand.
* This is a classic example of individualized corruption as defined by Dr Carino. This is often done by the extreme scalawags of the Navy, which are not few.

Fraud Against Government (Pilferage) – "Any person subject to military law who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willfully misappropriates, applies to his own use or benefit, or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property of the government furnished or intended for the military services thereof." (Article of War Nr 95)

Case Illustration # 4

On March 1995, the CO of a patrol gunboat PG3 received a directive from the Naval Task Force 71(NTF71) to conduct MARLEN patrol around the waters off Saranggani. The CO then re-provisioned and re-fueled to full tank capacity for the protracted mission. After refueling, PG3 left port. However, when they were already out at sea, instead of conducting MARLEN patrols as directed, the CO instructed the crew to moor their patrol boat to a payaw or fish marker.

After securing their patrol boat to the payaw, the CO then ordered to shut off the engine. During this time, the CO was constantly reporting to NTF71 that his craft was continuously patrolling the designated area. After four days of being moored to the payaw, PG3 went back to port.

The CO then reported the negative result of his patrol to the NTF71 Commander and then made a phone call to a contact. Early morning the next day, a motor launch went alongside PG3. After a few hours, the motor launch left but not after siphoning 10,000 liters of fuel saved by PG3 during the operation and paying the CO P60,000.00 as payment at P6/liter.

Case illustration # 5

On October 1999, the CO of patrol ship PS2, went to the Petron Bulk Plant in Cagayan de Oro to make a "special arrangement" regarding the delivery of fuel to his ship. He wanted Petron to give him P60,000.00 in cash instead of delivering the 10,000 liters of fuel his ship had requested. That way, he added, the Petron station would even earn some more from the transaction. He assured Petron that his ship will receive the "ghost delivery" accordingly.

The CO thought that since he over-declared his ship’s fuel consumption, he had a fuel savings of 10,000 liters and this would cover for the "ghost delivery". Intelligence operatives got wind of the transaction and an investigation soon followed. When the verdict was out and the information was confirmed, the unscrupulous CO was "punished" by the Headquarters by assigning him to another ship of the same category.

*Almost 3 out of 4 Navy vessels engage or have engaged in these types of malpractice. These occur in all geographical areas of operation, even in Manila Bay. Some CO’s try to justify this act by claiming that the money generated goes to ship operations or for morale and welfare activities. But for most, it is simply to sustain their high living. Worse, some CO’s sell the fuel to the very same smugglers they are supposed to apprehend.

Shore-based Corruption

Malversation – "Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property…"(Art 217 Revised Penal Code 1987)

Case illustration # 6

In 1999, patrol gunboat PG4 underwent major repairs that had a budget cost of cost P50 million. While the vessel was drydocked in Navotas, the Executive Officer found out that the steel plates placed on the hull were below the specifications stated in the work order. He then reviewed the other areas of the work package and discovered that most of the spare parts being installed during the overhauling of the main engines were used ones coming from another gunboat of the same class that had been mothballed. Thus, when he computed the actual cost incurred by the contractor, the total repair package should have been only P5 million.

The EXO then went to the Headquarters to complain about the repair irregularities and the grossly overpriced contract; he was surprised to find out that the repair had already been accepted by the Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee six months before, which means that the contractor had already been paid even while the repair was still unfinished. Six months later, PG4 completely bogged down right after a send-off ceremony for deployment. It is now programmed for another major repair.

Case illustration # 7

On 22 December 1999 during the Command Christmas Party, the Commander of the Philippine Fleet distributed P450.00 each to all the personnel in his Command (For a total number of personnel at above 4,000, this would compute to roughly P2 million). Then on January 2000, the Patrol Force (a major unit of Philippine Fleet) prepared documents for the "ghost repair" of an already operational patrol gunboat amounting to P3 million apparently as payment for the cash advanced by a favored dealer during the said Christmas party.
* Case illustrations # 6 and 7 will show why only 38% of the total naval assets are operational. For the Navy top brass to say that the Navy has few patrol boats is because of their own undoing. Had these funds for repair (almost P350 million in the present budget) been used properly all these years, there would have been more ships to patrol our waters. A patrol boat with a speed of 20 knots is capable of patrolling an area of almost 3,000 sq n.mi. in a ten-hour patrol. Several boats positioned properly, could project a Naval presence in the vast Philippine waters that could effectively deter outlaws.
Case illustration # 8
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Personnel, O-N1, among other functions, is the staff in charge of personnel accounting. It listed the total number of active military personnel (officers and EP) at 19,714. This total excludes those assigned at the General Headquarters (GHQ). On the other hand, the Philippine Navy Finance Center (PNFC) is the unit in charge of providing the pay and allowances of personnel. In the PNFC list, the total number of personnel (excluding those assigned in GHQ since their salaries are handled by the AFP Finance Center) is 20,496 or 782 more than O-N1’s total. Simply put, the Navy is paying an additional 782 personnel whose whereabouts are unknown.
*These "ghost personnel" came from those who have left the service through attrition, AWOL, retirement, death, etc., and have not been dropped deliberately from the payroll.
Case illustration # 9
All officers assigned in the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN) get an average of P3,000.00 each monthly as "incentive pay". To afford this, the HPN prepares documents for "ghost deliveries" also known as "conversion". At 193 officers, this would amount to almost P600,000.00 a month.
*This is done in almost all major units that have the authority to procure. Other variations of this are over-pricing, under delivery and substitution. This is easily done because of collusion between dealers and all those involved in the procurement process. The COA Auditors give a blind eye to these irregularities because they receive commissions equivalent to 1-2 percent of the total amount in the purchase orders. A PCIJ report further states that: "After 1991, negotiated deals became the norm, with the AFP going straight to the President for whatever big purchase it wants to make. Nearly all these deals turned disadvantageous- if not downright disastrous- to troops in the end…officers say that corruption has become so pervasive in the AFP that the crooks in their midst have evolved a vocabulary of their own. For instance, one colonel said, ‘cost of money’ means ’the amount a proponent pays to facilitators for making his dreams come true’. ’Cleared money’, meanwhile, is ‘money (procurement budget) that has been converted (to other uses), which one could spend anywhere.’ Put another way, it is ‘laundered money’, he said. Contractors for their part said that the evolving consensus among them is that some service commands are more corrupt than others. Their integrity meter puts the Army on top, followed by General Headquarters, and then the Navy. The Air Force ranks last, they said, for allegedly being the most corrupt." Overpricing "in the Navy is about 100 to 200 percent."(Mangahas, 2001)
EFFECTS ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The direct effects of corruption in the Navy on national development are staggering. It affects the economy through the systemic rape of the funds entrusted to it. These include losses from the ghost payroll, ghost repairs, ghost deliveries/conversion, pilferage of fuel, overpriced purchases, etc.
Indirectly, the effects are so much worse. According to Tangco: "Smugglers, poachers and pirates rob the economy of billions in lost revenue and taxes, ultimately sapping the strength of local industries and commerce and often times inflicting serious damage on the natural environment."(Tangco, 1998: 177)
Then "Senator Orlando Mercado, who chairs the Senate Committee on national defense and security, estimates that around 600,000.00 metric tons of fish worth an astounding P50 billion are lost annually due to poaching by foreign fishing vessels." (Tangco, 1998: 177)
Even more alarming is its indirect effect on national security. Thousands of people have already died in the decades-old secessionist war even as the government continue to spend billions trying to contain secessionists and bandits on the ground, when they could have been greatly weakened simply by a sustained naval presence. The existence of the MILF is hinged on its unimpeded supply lines from sympathetic countries that pass through sea-lanes wittingly provided by the Navy primarily because of corruption.
As for the Abu Sayyaf, while it may be true that they have fast kumpits, these boats are still detectable by radar and would not last long in a hot pursuit. Besides, they are not known to go island hopping if they knew that there were Navy boats patrolling the high seas.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The prospects for the future of the Navy have been defined by two recent events: The success story that happened at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) in 2000 and the PN leadership crisis on February 2001 which involved RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP and the Philippine Marines.
The NETC is the training arm of the Navy. It is responsible for the conduct of basic, advanced and specialization courses for officers and enlisted personnel. Since NETC is technically a school, bulk of its purchases are for uniforms and accessories; school/office supplies; and training materials. With an annual budget of P169 million (P121M for salaries and P48 M for supplies, based on the NETC OPB for CY – 2000), the NETC had become the object of larceny by previous Commanders, which resulted to the corrosion of the whole training system of the Navy.
On December 1999, Commodore Ruben G Domingo AFP assumed as Commander of NETC. Knowing the dark history of his unit and the tasks at hand, he immediately set into motion a reform program centered into the cleansing of the procurement system. And the result was astounding. In one year, the NETC, not only accomplished its mission of conducting all programmed courses, it had also accumulated P5 million worth of savings.

These savings were then used to improve other training facilities and equipment. The complete eradication of corruption was achieved. He did this, first, by removing suspected scalawags from staff positions then replacing them with officers whom he perceived to be still unstained by the grime of corruption. Then, Commo Domingo simply instructed everyone to do things "by the book".

Particularly, the religious and transparent implementation of canvassing and bidding procedures of procurement set forth by existing laws and guidelines. No "conversion" or "substitution" was allowed. As a safety net, he involved the Intelligence division to monitor the process and set up entrapment operations whenever necessary.

Surprisingly, Commo Domingo’s reform program did not resemble the "radical redesigning" concept of Reengineering (Hammer, 1993), the "entrepreneurial government" spirit espoused by the Reinventing Government (Osborne, 1990) nor was it a form of "Neo-Taylorism" (Reyes 1998, 189). Its only main components were his technical competence, moral integrity and political will as a Commander; specifically, the technical competence to formulate reforms, and the moral integrity and political will to enforce them.

On December 2000, when RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP assumed as Flag-Officer-In-Command (FOIC) of the Philippine Navy everybody in the Navy expected radical changes. RAdm Wong, who had a reputation of being incorruptible, had envisioned a totally corrupt-free Navy. Upon assumption, he went on a "crusading mode" by "going to several places trying to clean up the Navy" (Pazzibugan, 2001). On February 2001, the Navy (and the AFP) was rocked by a leadership crisis when the Philippine Marines demanded the relief of the RAdm Wong (Pazzibugan, 2001). The crisis was triggered by the berating of the Marines by RAdm Wong for alleged irregularities in the procurement of P3.8 million worth of Kevlar Helmets (Pablo, 2001).

In the events that followed, President Arroyo left the crisis to be resolved by then AFP Chief of Staff Gen Angelo Reyes (Pablo, 2001), who offered Wong the command of the newly formed Northern Command as a concession for his being relieved as FOIC. RAdm Wong, realizing that this was a demotion, opted to resign (Pazzibugan, 2001). Later on Pres Arroyo was "asked if she was satisfied with the way Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Angelo Reyes had handled the conflict between Wong and the Marine Corps, The President said Reyes had done the right thing." (Pablo, 2001). RAdm Wong was eventually replaced by RAdm Hingco, whose policy was to disregard all reforms initiated by his predecessor and revert to the previous status quo.
For a President and Commander-in-Chief, whose government was supposed to be founded on such slogans as "New Politics", moral regeneration and good governance, to say that what Gen Reyes did was the right thing was truly demoralizing to say the least.

This was the first indication of the type of leadership the AFP will expect from its Commander-in-Chief. RAdm Wong should have been fully backed by his Chief of Staff and his Commander-in-Chief as he was on the right and principled side. More importantly, he was the foremost practitioner of good governance and, certainly, someone who has both the moral ascendancy and political will to effect change in the Navy. Unfortunately, according to the "New Politics" philosophy of Pres.Arroyo, this is not so.

The two events narrated symbolize both hope and despair. Hope in that there is still a chance for the Navy to get out of the hole its officers and former officers had created. And despair at the thought that this chance is reliant on a politics-administration dichotomy (Wilson, 1887), which was best described by Dr Danilo R Reyes in one of his lectures as a mere "pretender" paradigm.

CONCLUSION

The corruption problem in the Philippine Navy is grave. The direct and indirect damages to our economy, national security and peace and order in terms of costs and lives lost had been devastating and continue to be so. Thus, impeding our efforts on national development.

The obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the Navy’s fleet are not the reasons for its ineffectiveness but they are the results of years of malversation of funds. But ill-equipped as it is, the Navy is still very capable of ISO and MARLEN operations if only there are CO’s and officers who have enough moral decency to be faithful to their mandated tasks.
The corruption had become systemic and had eaten through the very core of the organization and had infected, practically, all levels of the bureaucracy and all areas of operation.

The future of the Navy is clouded by mixed insights. On one hand, the success of the NETC model was a ray of light amidst the darkness of moral decadence. It proved that total eradication of corruption in a major unit in the Navy is possible. The next step is magnifying this accomplishment to a higher plane, the Philippine Navy Command itself. More importantly, it showed how it could be done simply through the Commander’s political will with moral integrity and technical competence as primary requisites.

On the other hand, however, this will only be possible if the next crusading Flag-Officer-In-Command would be fully supported by a Commander-in-Chief who possesses strong leadership qualities and who would not allow political concessions and political indebtedness be the bases of his/her decision-making as regards AFP matters. This way, the whole AFP Officer Corps will not get the impression that they are being treated as an organization of untouchables who can get away with anything.

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